

# **AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST**



# Angola

## I. Summary

Angola does not have significant drug production, trafficking, or use. Cannabis is cultivated and consumed locally, but in relatively modest quantities. Angolan drug counternarcotics officials report seizures of cocaine coming from South America, which they believe was headed for South Africa. Nigerian traffickers appear involved in this cocaine traffic predominantly from Brazil to South Africa. Angola is the only Southern African Development Community member that has not signed the SADC counternarcotics protocol.

## II. Status of Country

Angola is not a major center of drug production, trafficking, money laundering, or precursor chemical diversion, and it is not likely to become one. In 2001, despite serious resource constraints, the Angolan National Police increased dramatically the amount of cocaine and cannabis they seized. The police attributed the increased number of seizures to the ever-greater emphasis they placed on drug seizures and greater awareness of Angola as a transshipment point for cocaine.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

Angola has not signed the SADC counternarcotics protocol. There have been no reported cases of public corruption connected to narcotics trafficking.

Although Angola has enacted legislation mandating treatment for those convicted of narcotics use, no public treatment centers are available. Angola cooperates with South Africa in fighting the flow of cocaine from Angola to South Africa, and South Africa has offered training and equipment to the Angolan police. Angola also cooperates on a regional basis via SADC, despite its failure to sign the drug protocol. Angola has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

## IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

FY 2001 marked the first time the State Department has offered centrally funded anticrime and counternarcotics training programs for Angola; the USG intends to continue to offer counternarcotics law enforcement training to Angolan enforcement officials, especially at ILEA-Gaborone. This stems, in part, from agreements reached during the Bilateral Consultative Commission meetings in which Angola expressed strong interest in receiving law enforcement training. As such, the U.S. Embassy in Luanda is establishing a system for managing a continuing U.S. narcotics training relationship with Angola.

# Benin

## I. Summary

Benin is a transit route for illegal narcotics moving through West Africa, but it is not a major narcotics producing country. Illegal drug trafficking and GOB drug seizures continued throughout the year. The GOB is seeking to implement a national counternarcotics policy and national action plan, as well as to coordinate drug enforcement operations through the Central Office Against Illegal Drug Trafficking (OCERTID). Benin is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Benin is not a major producer of drugs or a source of precursor chemicals. This is not likely to change. The Benin Direction of Pharmacies has a special unit to control precursor chemicals that works with the National Laboratory for Narcotics Control, but the unit seems poorly organized and administration of the unit is weak. The laboratory has reported problems with the functioning of its chemical control equipment and it is unlikely that procedures currently in place present any great challenge to motivated smugglers of precursor chemicals.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** The Ministry of Interior completed the draft of a comprehensive national counternarcotics policy and developed a detailed national action plan in 2000. In December 2000, Benin's leading counternarcotics enforcement officials and government leaders convened a roundtable to discuss counternarcotics priorities and to identify ways to finance, support, and implement the GOB's counternarcotics policy. Frustrated by a profound lack of resources, authorities in Benin plan thoroughly, but then are forced to acknowledge that plans must remain theoretical until resources become available to implement them.

The GOB has not yet established the infrastructure or legal apparatus to enforce its comprehensive counternarcotics law enacted in 1997. The law is based on the UNDCP model, which is designed to bring countries into compliance with the 1988 UN Drug Convention. It criminalizes money laundering and provides for stronger sentences for narcotics offenses, asset forfeiture, and inter-agency cooperation in narcotics law enforcement.

**Accomplishments.** Clarification and elaboration of the national counternarcotics action plan was this year's major accomplishment. The GOB's national action plan identifies ten counternarcotics strategies to be implemented over the next six years. The plan has three major objectives:

- Improve the strategies to combat the use of illegal drugs;
- Reinforce current programs to fight against illegal drug production and trafficking;
- Develop strategies to prevent drug abuse and provide for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers.

The national counternarcotics policy identifies six priorities and four complementary programs. The six priorities are:

- Coordinate the national effort against illegal narcotics;
- Provide additional resources for the national drug laboratory;

- Provide additional resources to law enforcement agencies, increasing their drug intervention capabilities;
- Reinforce smuggling controls at the Port of Cotonou, Benin's major shipping port);
- Develop programs to prevent drug use and to treat drug abusers; and
- Create a national health center for drug abusers.

Complementary projects focus on illegal drug production, prescription drug abusers/traffickers, prevention programs for single families, and the creation of a canine brigade.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** The country's porous borders permit African drug traffickers, primarily Nigerian nationals, to transit Benin freely and to access its ports at will. This ease of access has made Benin a transshipment point for the regional and sub-regional narcotics trade in heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. The large Lebanese community in Benin organizes and operates an important part of the drug trade. Some ethnic South Asians living in Benin also traffic in heroin from Afghanistan via Pakistan. In most instances, the different traffickers work with Benin nationals who act as couriers in the distribution/sale process. The retail price per gram ranges from 17,000-25,000 CFA (African Franc) (U.S. \$23-\$34) for cocaine, 9,000-20,000 (U.S. \$12-\$27) for heroin and 300-500 CFA (U.S. \$40-\$70) for marijuana. Even though Nigerian nationals control the drug trafficking activities in Benin, more than 60 per cent of traffickers arrested in 2001 were Benin nationals.

The law enforcement agency with primary responsibility for combating narcotics smuggling and drug abuse is the recently created OCERTID. The OCERTID reports to the director general of the national police, and works with customs, the gendarmes, and the national police drug units. The OCERTID so far has reported no cases of law enforcement involvement in illegal narcotics trafficking.

In 2001, the United States and the GOB signed a letter of agreement (LOA) relating to counternarcotics assistance in 2001. Through this LOA, the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs granted Benin two machines used for the detection of concealed narcotics for use at the airport and will provide appropriate training. Although this is a small step, it demonstrates the GOB's commitment to improving the interdiction ability of its law enforcement agencies, with U.S. assistance.

In 2001, Beninese enforcement officials seized 810,830 kilos of cannabis, 13 kilos of cannabis resin, 31.74 kilos of cocaine, 414 grams of opium, 5.2 kilos of LSD, and 79 grams of heroin. No drug traffickers have been extradited to date. Fifty-two traffickers were sentenced to imprisonment in 2001: 35 Beninese, 11 Nigerian, 1 French, 4 Niger nationals, and 1 Ivoirian.

**Corruption.** The press, civil society, and some senior government officials themselves charge there are corrupt elements in government. Twenty-three magistrates to date have been arrested or are being detained for allegations of taking bribes and engaging in corrupt practices. Numerous officials at the Port of Cotonou were arrested last year for a variety of improprieties in a surprise raid launched by the Minister of Finance. Press reports hinted at problems with the disposition of drug evidence (i.e., disappearance of seized drugs), but the exact extent of corruption and its impact on law enforcement and counternarcotics operations is difficult to assess, partly because resistance to oversight reform still persists within many government entities.

**Cultivation/Production.** Benin produces a small amount of cannabis for local consumption. It is the only narcotic produced in Benin and is cultivated throughout the country, particularly in hard to access marshy areas and along the borders with Nigeria and with Togo.

**Agreements/Treaties.** Benin has a quadripartite counternarcotics agreement with Togo, Ghana, and Nigeria. In addition to being a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, Benin is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In December 2000, Benin signed the UN Convention

against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. A drug enforcement cooperation agreement between France and Benin is in force and bolsters Benin's counternarcotics efforts.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** From November 2000-February 2001, an inter-ministerial team (Comité Interministeriel de Lutte Contre l'Abus de Stupefiants-CILAS) toured several Departments of Benin to discuss demand reduction. The team visited secondary schools, railway stations, and other spots where they hoped to access drug users or those in danger of becoming drug abusers. This hands-on approach seems to be more effective than spot radio and TV messages, but funds available to support it are starkly limited. The Ministry of Justice also has a program to reduce the use of marijuana by prison inmates. Several NGOs have drug education programs and run treatment for drug users. The Lion's Club International has an education/rehabilitation program, and there is also an NGO-managed SOS drug hotline.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Benin is an important transit/staging point for Southeast Asian heroin being smuggled to Nigeria for onward transport to Europe and the United States, and for South American cocaine being transported to Nigeria en route to Europe. There is no evidence that the heroin that enters the United States from Benin is sufficient to have a major impact on the United States. Marijuana from Nigeria transits Benin on its way to other African countries. Nigerians dominate most drug trafficking activities in Benin. In addition to transiting the country overland, drugs depart the country via Cotonou's airport and seaport.

#### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**U.S. Goals and Objectives.** The primary objective of the U.S. government is to combat the transit of drugs to the United States and Europe. The goal is to build on successful counternarcotics cooperation efforts, focusing on prevention, interdiction, prosecution, and treatment.

**The Road Ahead.** Benin is beginning to seriously address the drug problem in the region by implementing coordinated counternarcotics measures. This is obviously the first step down a long road. The U.S. government must continue to engage Benin on the complex issues of counternarcotics enforcement, asset forfeiture, abuse education, and training, particularly in the area of money laundering, and other focused assistance. Border and port control measures are two obvious priority areas, as is increased training of enforcement personnel.

# Botswana

## I. Summary

Botswana is not a major producer of illicit drugs or precursor chemicals, and it is not a significant drug-transit country. Isolated pockets of marijuana cultivation occur, but eradication efforts keep production levels low. Botswana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and is the site of Southern Africa's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).

## II. Status of Country

Botswana is not a major illicit drug producer or a significant drug-transit country, despite an increase in the overall amount of cannabis seized and concern over its porous borders. In 2001, drug control officials seized sizable amounts of cannabis, as well as small amounts of crack cocaine. Due to an increase in the number of drug-related arrests in Botswana, drug control officials are concerned about an upsurge in drug trafficking and abuse. Cannabis remains the drug of choice due to its low price. Individuals caught with drugs in Botswana can expect fines and prison sentences, but most arrests do not result in conviction.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

The Government of Botswana created a National Drug Control Coordination Council, chaired by the Office of the President, in 1998. The Government of Botswana also has strict legislation against drug production, drug trafficking, and money laundering, whether associated with the drug trade, terrorism, or other illicit activity. Botswana courts mete out stiff sentences for drug-related offenses, with mandatory sentences of one to five years' imprisonment for possession of fewer than 60 grams of cannabis, and five to ten years for possession of more than 60 grams. Relatively few of the 378 cases in 2001 in which individuals were arrested for cannabis use proceeded to trial; the authorities preferring leniency to strict pursuit of punishment.

The number of seizures of drugs in Botswana increased markedly in 2001. Police seized over 1,200 kilograms of cannabis during 2001, mostly from Zimbabwean traffickers. (Cannabis seized from Zimbabwe is now thought to originate in Mozambique, rather than from Zambia, as it was thought in 2000.) In 2001, police seized what they believe to be the third of three shipments of cocaine that originated from Brazil, which transited South Africa before it arrived in Botswana. Most of the cocaine entering Botswana for domestic use is believed to be crack cocaine. The BPS (Botswana Police Service) also has reported four cases of illicit cannabis cultivation, resulting in the seizure of 2 kilograms of cannabis. The BPS reports good cooperation on narcotics control with its regional partners, especially South Africa and Zimbabwe. The UNDCP has provided drug detection dogs to Botswana for use in drug searches. There are no indications of senior government officials being involved in drug-related corruption.

Botswana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

## IV. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S.-sponsored ILEA offered its first course of instruction in September 2001. The ILEA program includes modules on narcotics interdiction. Regional police officials anticipate more cooperation with the USG as ILEA programs continue to develop. Police officials note that they are concerned that Botswana's porous border with Zimbabwe may lead to increased drug trafficking through Botswana. The GOB

recently sent units of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) to replace the Special Branch of the BPS in conducting alien interdiction on the Zimbabwe border, due to concerns about increased crime in Francistown, where the Special Branch forces were located.

# Cote D'Ivoire

## I. Summary

With the most fully developed economy in West Africa and significant opportunities for corruption at all levels, Côte d'Ivoire's ports, airport, porous borders, and communications infrastructure remain open to drug traffickers. Seizures of heroin and cannabis, as well as seizures of licit pharmaceuticals destined for illegal distribution increased in 2001. The target market for most of the narcotics passing through Côte d'Ivoire (principally heroin) remains Europe, with a smaller share ending up on the North American market. The quantity of narcotics that transit Côte d'Ivoire en route to North America is not sufficient to have a significant impact on the United States. Two years of political instability have detracted from Ivoirian law enforcement's ability to account for seizures and local consumption and interrupted development of new counternarcotics legislation. U.S. support to Ivoirian counternarcotics efforts was stopped after the Christmas coup of 1999. As political stability returns, authorities speak of new initiatives against narcotics and corruption, but resources are lacking. Côte d'Ivoire is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Abidjan, the business and industrial capital of Cote d'Ivoire, is a major West African financial center and a regional hub for shipping. Cote d'Ivoire's corruption-plagued ports handle a variety of contraband, including narcotics and weapons. Air travel through Côte d'Ivoire has been curtailed with the withdrawal of three major European airlines and the financial collapse of Air Afrique. This loss of service has probably decreased the utility of Abidjan's airport as a transit point for drugs. Despite improvements to airport facilities and security, airport operating budgets and training remain problematic. The ongoing conflict in neighboring Liberia adds to the pressure for corruption, with players in that conflict paying off officials in Cote d'Ivoire to gain passage for diamonds leaving the region and weapons entering.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Drug enforcement authorities await the re-commencement of the African Anti-Drug Program, an EU initiative that was suspended two years ago due to the political situation. The program was the principal source of guidance and resources for Ivoirian counternarcotics efforts. There are no new unilateral initiatives within the Ivoirian government, which maintains an underfunded training program at Grand Bassam. The special narcotics police remain a low funding priority.

**Accomplishments.** Because of political instability and minimal funding for counternarcotics initiatives, there were no significant accomplishments during the reporting period. The Ivoirian government has negotiated with the EU to restart the African Anti-Drug Program, but results will not be realized until 2002.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Given limited resources, the Ivoirian government has not made an effort to strengthen the counternarcotics police or the national prosecutor's office with personnel or budgetary increases or new training. The administrators of the Felix Houphouet-Boigny International Airport in Abidjan have modernized the terminal, increased visible security measures, and implemented a more accountable access badge system. During the first nine months of 2001, seizures of heroin and cannabis increased, and the trend for heroin seizures since 1998 shows a steady yearly increase. Enforcement officials do not know whether this represents better police work or an increase in heroin trafficking. Figures for cocaine seizures are inconsistent, but seem to show a declining trend in the past four years. Cannabis figures are likewise inconsistent for the four-year period, but appear stable or increasing. Despite resource constraints, arrests have increased. 605 individuals were reported arrested through September 30,

2001. All 11 persons arrested in 2001 for trafficking “hard” drugs (i.e., cocaine, heroin) were not Ivoirian nationals (nine Nigerians, one Togolese, and one Gambian). Authorities have also seized considerable quantities of licit pharmaceuticals destined for illegal distribution, reporting seizures of 42,592 valium tablets, 68 kilograms of valium in other forms, and an assortment of other medications, both in pill and unprocessed form.

**Corruption.** Corruption continues to hamper Ivoirian counternarcotics efforts. The Office of the National Prosecutor did not report a single prosecution for official corruption during the reporting period. Senior counternarcotics police officials report that some lower ranking officials view counternarcotics assignments as desirable because these assignments provide officials opportunities to earn additional income by accepting bribes. The same is true for some security officials at the airport, ports, and borders.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Côte d’Ivoire is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Psychotropic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Côte d’Ivoire has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Côte d’Ivoire is also party to several regional agreements regarding narcotics suppression and control, negotiated among members of the West African Economic Cooperation Association. Officials report discussions of a new West African counternarcotics regime with Ghana, Nigeria, and other interested West African states. However, the effort is nascent, and no written proposals have been made.

**Cultivation/Production.** Cannabis is the main drug produced internally in Côte d’Ivoire. It is grown in small plots, mixed in with legal plantings, throughout southern Côte d’Ivoire. It is processed and sold at retail levels in small quantities by small dealers. Cities remain the principal destination and distribution points. Law enforcement officials will destroy illegal plantings when discovered, but search and destroy missions are not a priority. Law enforcement officials do not keep records on seizures and volume destroyed at this level of production and do not estimate the total production of cannabis. Police report that there have been no discoveries of processing laboratories for heroin, cocaine, or synthetic substances in Côte d’Ivoire.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Ivoirian law enforcement officials do not keep statistics on the flow of drugs through Côte d’Ivoire; information is anecdotal and informal. Based on limited seizures at Felix Houphouët-Boigny International Airport, authorities believe that Nigeria and Pakistan are points of origin for trafficking in heroin via human mules (balloon swallowers) and smuggled packages. The drugs interdicted are usually passing through Abidjan en route to Europe. Major ports in Abidjan and at San Pedro in western Côte d’Ivoire are also thought to be easy transit points, though it is not known how often these ports are used. Côte d’Ivoire’s international borders are porous to passage of all manner of contraband into, through and out of the country due to the corruption of local officials, who supplement meager government salaries with sale of passage. Police officials also report use of the Ivoirian postal system for retail size shipments of drugs, generally heroin and cocaine, which are then sold locally.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** The principal organization to fight the spread of drug use in Cote d’Ivoire, the Regional Education Center for the Fight Against Drugs (CRFLD), is a sub-ministry office in the Interior Ministry. This poorly funded but energetic office is the focal point for government and citizen efforts to discourage drug use. There are no high-visibility public campaigns against drug use in Côte d’Ivoire, though smaller efforts are evident at times. At the national prosecutor’s office, the drug problem is not viewed as a significant threat to Ivoirian society. The EU has not funded its demand-side program headquartered in Abidjan, which provided western expertise in demand and addiction issues, since the 1999 coup.

### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**U.S. Policy Initiatives.** The principal U.S. policy aim continues to be to minimize Côte d'Ivoire's attractiveness to drug smugglers, and thereby reduce the overall flow of illegal drugs through the country, through transit control and anticorruption measures.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** There are no U.S.-Ivoirian joint projects to control drug production, consumption or trafficking through Côte d'Ivoire. Funding for all such projects was suspended in early 2000 after the December 1999 coup d'état and has not been resumed.

**The Road Ahead.** Both police and prosecutors see drug consumption and trafficking as steadily increasing problems. However, internal consumption is simply not viewed by the Ivoirian government as a high enough priority to receive a significant share of limited government resources. As long as the principal U.S. policy interest remains interdiction of drugs transiting Côte d'Ivoire en route to the United States and Europe, material and training assistance to Ivoirian authorities would be the most constructive measures to be taken. The Ivoirian authorities would welcome joint initiatives to train, motivate, and help equip counternarcotics police and banking investigators.

# Egypt

## I. Summary

The Arab Republic of Egypt is not a major producer, supplier, or consumer of narcotics or precursor chemicals. Heroin and cannabis are transported through Egypt, but at decreasing levels in 2001. The Anti Narcotics General Administration, the main drug fighting organization, is competent and progressive and it cooperates fully with the DEA office in Egypt. Egypt is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Although opium and cannabis are grown in Egypt, Egypt is not a significant producer or consumer of narcotics or precursor chemicals. The substances most commonly abused in Egypt are cannabis, known locally as “BANGO,” and legitimate pharmaceuticals.

Narcotics destined primarily for Western Europe, with small amounts headed for the United States, do pass through Egypt, but this transshipment route continued to diminish in 2001. There is no evidence of significant levels of narcotics reaching the United States through Egypt. Egypt’s long and mostly uninhabited borders combined with the high level of shipping passing through the Suez Canal have made Egypt prone to the transshipment of Asian heroin. Narcotics also pass through Cairo International Airport periodically.

The Egyptian Anti Narcotics General Administration (ANGA) is considered to be the oldest narcotics unit in the Arab world. ANGA has jurisdiction for all criminal matters pertaining to narcotics and maintains offices in all major Egyptian cities, airports, and ports. The U.S. DEA office in Egypt has a superb relationship with ANGA. The DEA’s ANGA counterparts are open, cooperative, and receptive to ideas and training. DEA country attachés have seen progressive improvements in ANGA’s capabilities compared to its limited resources. The DEA assists ANGA in smuggling interdiction operations in the Suez Canal Zone and at Cairo Airport, as well as in crop eradication operations in the Sinai Peninsula and Upper Egypt. The DEA has facilitated training for ANGA officers at regional narcotics training courses in Nairobi, Kenya, and provided in-country training on airport interdictions.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

The Government of Egypt (GOE) continues to aggressively pursue a comprehensive drug control strategy which was developed in 1998. ANGA, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, Coast Guard, Customs Service, and select military units all cooperate in task forces designed to interdict narcotics shipments. Government and private sector demand reduction efforts exist but are hampered by financial and logistical challenges.

**Accomplishments.** In 2001, the GOE implemented a law passed in 2000 allowing ANGA to keep a portion of the assets seized from narcotics traffickers to support interdiction operations. Final figures on assets seized in 2000 and 2001 are not yet available. In 1999, over 21 million Egyptian Pounds (LEG) were seized (approximately U.S. \$5.1 million at an average exchange rate of 4.25 LEG to U.S. \$1).

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Internal security and combating terrorism are the major focus of Egyptian law enforcement efforts. However, ANGA operates an effective program of investigating and targeting significant drug traffickers, intercepting narcotics shipments, and detecting and eradicating illegal crops. Large-scale seizures and arrests are rare primarily because Egypt does not have a large narcotics market or narcotics abuse culture. In addition to other government and private sector demand reduction programs, ANGA operates its own drug awareness campaign. ANGA’s Eradication Unit conducts monthly operations against cannabis and opium crops in the Sinai. Despite mixed results from a crop substitution

project in the Sinai, the amount of illegal crops was smaller in 2001. Final 2000 figures from ANGA report 27,898 criminal cases involving 29,612 defendants.

**Corruption.** There does not appear to be serious narcotics-related corruption in Egypt. Only low-level local police officials have been identified and arrested. The GOE has strict laws and harsh penalties for government officials convicted of involvement in narcotics trafficking or related activities.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Egypt and the U.S. have had an extradition treaty in place since the late 1800s. Egypt is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. The U.S.-Egypt Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty entered into force on November 29, 2001. Egypt has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

**Cultivation and Production.** Cannabis is grown year round in the northern and southern Sinai and in upper Egypt. Opium is grown in the southern Sinai from February through March. The UNDCP reports that opium production in Egypt has been declining while cannabis production has increased. Rugged terrain requires plots of illegal crops to be small and irregularly shaped. ANGA uses aerial observation and confidential informants to identify illegal plots and then conducts daylight eradication operations which consist of cutting and burning the plants. ANGA has yet to implement a planned herbicide eradication program. No heroin processing plants have been discovered in Egypt in the last 11 years. There is no evidence that opiates or cannabis grown in Egypt reach the United States in sufficient quantities to have a significant effect on the United States.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** In 2001, the GOE indicated it planned to revive the dormant National Council for Treatment of Addiction and Against Drug Abuse. Should the National Council become active, it would be an inter ministerial group chaired by the Prime Minister with the Minister of Social Affairs as his representative. Currently, most addicts are still treated by private doctors. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education, along with several religious organizations, operate drug awareness programs oriented toward demand reduction. The Ministry of Health is also a co-sponsor with the Ministry of Interior of a separate national counternarcotics campaign. These programs are aimed at school-aged children and rely on the mass media. DEA country attachés also assist the GOE with a drug awareness campaign.

#### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. counternarcotics policy in Egypt is to engage the GOE in a bilateral program to reduce narcotics transshipment and decrease opium and cannabis cultivation. The policy is supported by the following specific objectives:

- Increase training to ANGA and other government offices responsible for narcotics enforcement.
- Assist with the identification of illegal crop eradication targets.
- Improve narcotics interdiction methodology.
- Improve intelligence collection and analysis.

**The Road Ahead.** In FY 2002, the U.S. government plans to provide the GOE with additional training in police science, anticorruption measures, and border control operations. The DEA country office will continue to work closely with ANGA to improve interdiction and eradication techniques, and to develop additional sources of information on trafficking and production.

# Ethiopia

## I. Summary

Ethiopia does not play a major role in the production of illicit narcotics or precursor chemicals associated with the drug trade. Ethiopia is strategically located along a major narcotics transit route between Southwest Asian heroin production and European markets and West African trafficking networks. Cannabis is grown in Ethiopia, but most is consumed in rural areas of Ethiopia itself. Recent seizures indicate that opium poppy is being grown in Ethiopia, but only in a few small plots. More heroin is transiting Ethiopia for markets in West Africa, Europe, and the United States. Nigerian traffickers are active in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Counternarcotics Unit (ECNU) maintains an interdiction team at Bole International Airport, where the ECNU uses its two drug sniffer dogs to examine, with a degree of randomness, cargo and luggage. The ECNU routinely screens passengers, luggage, and cargo on flights arriving from “high risk” origins, i.e., Bangkok, New Delhi, Mumbai, and Islamabad. Ethiopia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Ethiopia is not now, and not likely to become, a significant producer of narcotic drugs or precursor chemicals. A small share of total cannabis is being produced for export, primarily to neighboring countries; the majority is consumed at home, but absolute quantities in both cases are moderate. For the first time, opium poppy was seized at two locations where it was apparently being grown as an experimental crop. Indications are that the techniques for growing the opium came from India and that the appearance of these apparent experimental plots may be explained by a downturn in coffee prices. No opium gum has been found yet.

## III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2001

The use of heroin and other hard drugs remains quite low, due primarily to the high street price and limited availability of such drugs. To the extent these hard drugs are available, it is in large part due to the “spillover” effect from the transiting of drug couriers through Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa. Bole is a major air hub for flight connections between Southeast and Southwest Asia and Africa, and much of the heroin entering and/or transiting Ethiopia comes from Asia. Many of the flights require up to a two-day layover in Addis, permitting the introduction of these drugs into the local populace.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** The ECNU has improved upon its performance in 2000. It has changed leadership and been more proactive at the federal level. At the unit level, the ECNU suffers from managerial/leadership problems, although the unit is getting better at following up on leads. The interdiction team at Bole has improved with the provision of several profiling and interdiction courses. The interdiction unit has improved its ability to identify male Nigerian/Tanzanian drug “mules” who traditionally swallow drugs to smuggle them. The ECNU also followed up on tips and discovered and eradicated two plots of opium poppy cultivation in remote areas. Follow up is limited to assistance provided by the United States, and the local budget does not allow for field operations.

**Policy Initiatives.** The Ethiopian Ministry of Justice is still updating the penal code, but the updated code could become law in the next three months. Currently the maximum sentence for trafficking is two to three years, which does not serve as an effective deterrent to using Ethiopia as a transit country. Additionally, Ethiopia lacks a central coordinating body to coordinate systematically counternarcotics activities of the Ministries of Education, Health, and Justice. There is no master plan for drug issues.

**Corruption.** There is no evidence of government corruption relating to illicit drugs. The Anti-Corruption Commission, created in May 2001, has been given substantial police powers to investigate corruption, and is attracting considerable attention with some high profile cases. In 2001, the Ethiopian government arrested and charged ministerial level government officials for corruption unrelated to drugs, and it is likely the government would address drug-related corruption in the same way.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Ethiopia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. Ethiopia has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

The United States introduced no major policy initiatives in 2001, except for initiatives in the areas of money laundering and asset seizure related to terrorist finances. In those areas the United States, through the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, is trying to raise the profile of the issue and encourage criminalization of money laundering.

The focus has remained on the law enforcement side, specifically the ECNU. Ethiopia has limited resources and must rely on assistance from external sources. Overall, the ECNU needs more training, better facilities, and improved access to resources.

# Ghana

## I. Summary

Ghana combats illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and mounts major efforts against drug abuse. It has active enforcement, treatment, and rehabilitation programs. Ghana-U.S. law enforcement coordination continues, and saw several successes in 2001. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Ghana is increasingly a transit point for illegal drugs, particularly cocaine and heroin from South America, and Southeast and Southwest Asia. Europe remains the major destination, but drugs also flow to South Africa and to North America. Accra's Kotoka International Airport is increasingly a focus for traffickers. Ports at Tema and Sekondi are also used. Border posts at Aflao (Togo) and Elubo and Sampa (Côte d'Ivoire) see significant traffic. Nigerian traffickers continue to strengthen their presence in Ghana as it becomes a major transportation hub. Trafficking fuels increasing domestic consumption. Cannabis use is increasing in Ghana, as is local cultivation. The government mounts significant public education programs. Production of precursor chemicals is not a major problem.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) coordinates government efforts involving counternarcotics activities. These activities include enforcement and control, education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and social re-integration. The NCB's counternarcotics national strategy, the "National Plan of Action 1999-2003," was submitted to the Cabinet in April 2001, and awaits formal approval. Amendments that the NCB proposed in 1999 to the 1990 narcotics law still await attention. Further proposed amendments include stricter application of bail bond system sanctions.

**Accomplishments.** The NCB and other law enforcement agencies continued their successful cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies. Most notably, this resulted in the extradition of two suspects (one on narcotics charges and the other on armed robbery charges) to the United States. The NCB's national drug education efforts increased in schools and churches, heightening citizens' awareness of the fight against narcotics and traffickers. Ghana attended a UNDCP-sponsored conference for heads of law enforcement organizations in Nairobi.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** The police's Criminal Investigative Division's (CID) narcotics unit based in Accra undertakes counternarcotics operations and prosecutions alone or in joint operations with agents of the NCB. NCB agents are not armed; they rely upon the CID in situations requiring armed force. Regional NCB narcotics squads are located at Kumasi, Koforidua, Ho, and Tema. New NCB offices opened in 2001 at CID headquarters in Accra, Accra Regional Police headquarters, and Kotoka International Airport (Accra). The Customs Excise and Preventative Service (CEPS) headquarters has a counternarcotics unit, with counternarcotics squads at two border posts, Aflao (Togo) and Elubo (Côte d'Ivoire), and at Kotoka International Airport. The government has authority to seize equipment and property, generally upon conviction; several cases are now before the courts.

Figures show a substantial increase in cocaine-related seizures but a decrease in cocaine arrests in 2001. (Figures for arrests and seizures in 2001 for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are for January through September only, and final figures for the year will be greater.) A gram of cocaine of average purity sells for cedis 105,000 (approx. U.S. \$15).

Figures show an increase in heroin-related seizures but a decrease in heroin arrests. A gram of heroin of average purity sells for cedis 155,000 (approx. U.S. \$22). Greater interdiction efforts may have raised the street price from year 2000.

Cannabis-related arrests decreased. Cannabis seizures appear roughly on track with those in 2000, which were double that of 1999. (Seizure figures for 2000 have been revised sharply upward. Preliminary figures from NCB last year under-reported quarterly results.) A kilogram of cannabis sells at cedis 15,000 (approx. U.S. \$2.10). A wrap or joint sells at approx. cedis 500 (approx. U.S. \$.07).

The police narcotics unit and the NCB have worked closely with the INS's regional office in Accra. Fruitful exchanges of information resulted in several successful investigations. The INS detected one fugitive from U.S. justice coaching visa applicants at the Embassy consular section; arrested by local police, he was later extradited. The NCB continued to work with DHL and Federal Express to intercept packages containing narcotics.

**Corruption.** In 2001, there were no narcotics-related public corruption cases reported. The new government's "Zero Tolerance" policy on all forms of public corruption has led to several high-profile prosecutions involving present and past government officials (none involve narcotics).

**Agreements and Treaties.** Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. U.S.-Ghana extradition relations are governed by the 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, to which Ghana acceded at its independence. Additionally, Ghana is a party to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol Agreement, which includes an extradition provision.

**Cultivation and Production.** Cannabis (also known as Indian hemp) is easily available and abused widely. Cultivated in rural farmlands, there is a ready market in urban areas. The Volta, Brong-Ahafo, Western, and Ashanti regions are principal growing areas. Most is consumed locally; some is trafficked to neighboring and European countries. Cannabis is usually harvested in September and October, and law enforcement teams increase their surveillance and investigation efforts at these times. Combined NCB and police teams continue to investigate production and distribution, and to destroy cultivated cannabis farms and plants. The NCB believes a local drug laboratory processing cannabis into hashish now exists. Efforts to locate it continue.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Cocaine and heroin are the main drugs that transit Ghana, chiefly from South America, and Southeast and Southwest Asia. Narcotics are sometimes repackaged for reshipment to the United States and Europe. New methods of concealment in 2001 included hiding drugs in room air conditioners, rice cookers, and women's brassieres. While, in absolute terms, drugs transiting Ghana do not yet contribute significantly to the supply of drugs to the U.S. market, Accra is an increasingly important transshipment point from Africa. Direct flights from Accra play an important role in the transshipment of heroin to the U.S. by West African trafficking organizations. For example, these flights account for the largest quantity of heroin seized at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York from Africa. Indications are that the trafficking is on the rise, with Nigerian-based trafficking organizations at the heart of the problem.

The NCB believes Nigerians dominate local cocaine and heroin trafficking routes, often using Malian passports. Many traffickers land in Mali and travel overland to Ghana. Liberian and Sierra Leonan refugees resident in Ghana also participate. Couriers from Curacao, arriving on flights from Europe, are also a concern. Ghanaian passports, easily obtainable, are often used fraudulently. Smugglers often purchase their tickets in Ghana because the exchange rate favors their currencies.

**Demand Reduction.** The NCB works with schools, professional training institutions, churches, local governments, and the general public. A draft Drug Education Policy is now before the government for use in all schools. The NCB continues its work with Drug Free Clubs in secondary schools throughout the country, and with the Ghana Education Service and its counseling and welfare units to oversee drug

education efforts. The Ministries of Health and Education further coordinate their efforts through their representatives on the Board. The NCB also worked with numerous church groups during the year with its Sensitization Program. It has now conducted drug education programs with 106 of the country's 110 districts assemblies, and with such entities as the Ghana Institute of Management and Professional Training and the Regional Maritime Academy. The NCB once again participated in the International Day Against Drug Abuse in June. It frequently hosts public lectures, participates in radio discussion programs, and encourages newspaper articles on the dangers of drug abuse and trafficking. The NCB continues its collaboration with the UNDCP's Regional Office for West and Central Africa; the UNDCP's Rapid Situation Assessment of 1999 forms the basis for this cooperation.

Although treatment programs have lagged behind preventative education and enforcement due to lack of funding, there are three government psychiatric hospitals receiving drug patients, and three private facilities in Accra, run by local NGOs, also assisting drug abusers.

#### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

**U.S. Goals and Objectives.** The USG's counternarcotics and anticrime goals in Ghana are to strengthen Ghanaian law enforcement capacity generally, to improve interdiction capacities, to enhance the NCB's office and field operation functions, and to reduce Ghana's role as a transit point for narcotics.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** The DEA in Lagos and the INS in Ghana conducted a joint training program for NCB and CID narcotics officers during the summer. In December, a letter of agreement (LOA) between the United States and Ghana, under which the U.S. agreed to provide \$84,000 in equipment to the NCB, was approved. Also in December, the Ministry of the Interior and the U.S. Embassy signed an amendment to the LOA to provide \$294,500 for various law enforcement programs, including provision of narcotics detection devices for Kotoka International Airport. This amended LOA will be submitted to Parliament for approval not later than early 2002.

**The Road Ahead.** Improved narcotics interdiction, investigative capabilities, and prosecutorial successes sum up the USG's major policy goals. A focus on improved oversight of financial transactions and intervention in suspicious cases is a particular concern, particularly given the potential for any narcotics financial networks to be used by terrorist organizations. Internal affairs units for the police and CEPS would assist in purging them of unwanted elements, and ensuring united efforts against the scourge of drugs.

# Iran

## I. Summary

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a major transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan and through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. There is no evidence that narcotics transiting Iran reach the United States in an amount sufficient to have a significant effect on the United States. Iran is no longer a major drug producing country. An extensive 1998 U.S. survey concluded that the amount of opium poppy cultivation in Iran was negligible, down from an estimated 3,500 hectares in 1993. A follow-up survey in 1999 reached the same conclusion. Since then, an office of the UNDCP in Iran has repeatedly assured the international community that poppies are not cultivated in Iran. However, Iran remains a country of concern to the United States because of the quantity of drugs transiting Iran and the possibility, albeit remote, that poppy cultivation could re-commence. There is overwhelming evidence of Iran's strong commitment to keep drugs moving out of Afghanistan from reaching its citizens, and as Iran strives to achieve this goal, it certainly also prevents drugs from reaching markets in the West. Nevertheless, as with all former major illicit drug producing countries, the USG continues to watch closely for evidence of renewed poppy cultivation or evidence that drugs transiting Iran reach the United States in significant quantities.

Opium addiction in Iran has long historical roots, and it is a major social and health problem for the Islamic Republic's government. The Iranian government (GOI) estimates that about two percent of Iran's 65.6 million citizens (1,312,000) are regular drug abusers (drug-dependent addicts), but such observers of drug abuse worldwide as the UNDCP view this estimate as low. Other sources (including informed observers working on drug abuse in NGOs in Iran) estimate that as many as three million Iranians abuse drugs, with perhaps 500-600 thousand "casual" (i.e., non dependent) users. The GOI seems particularly concerned over the sharp increase in intravenous drug abuse; deaths from drug abuse increased by 60 percent to 611 individuals in the first four months of 2001. Inmates in prison and the homeless are the most likely to take drugs by intravenous injection and to contract HIV through sharing needles. Sixty-nine percent of all recorded HIV cases are associated with drug abuse.

The GOI has demonstrated a sustained political commitment to combating narcotics. Iran has been in the forefront of efforts by the international community to combat the Afghan drug trade. In 2000 alone, 65 Iranian law enforcement officers died in efforts to combat drug trafficking, and 3,000 law enforcement personnel have died in clashes with heavily armed drug traffickers over the last two decades. Iran spends a significant amount on drug-related expenses, estimates range from \$250-\$300 million to as much as \$800 million each year, depending on whether treatment and other social costs are included. Iran has made more efforts to combat the Afghan drug trade than any other country. Opiate drug seizures during 2001 were 207 metric tons of opium equivalent, quite a large seizure number in comparison to international seizure statistics, and still down sharply from recent-year seizures on the order of 450 metric tons of opium equivalents. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan under the Taliban became a serious security concern in Iran, with significant killing, kidnapping, and intimidation of villagers along Iran's border with Afghanistan.

Iran has ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but its laws do not bring it completely into conformity with the Convention. The UNDCP is working with Iran to modify its laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system.

## II. Status of Country

Land routes across Iran constitute the single largest conduit for Southwest Asian opiates en route to European markets. Entering from Afghanistan and Pakistan into eastern Iran, heroin, opium, and

morphine are smuggled overland, usually to Turkey but also to Turkmenistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Drugs are also smuggled by sea across the Persian Gulf. Iran is no longer a major drug-producing country; according to the UNDCP, there are no reports indicating illicit narcotics cultivation in Iran.

One of the most significant developments in Iran during 2001 was the sharp increase in the price of opium. During the first quarter of 2001, the street price of opium in Iran quadrupled from its year-end 2000 level. The price of opium stayed at this sharply higher level through September 2001. Statistics for the final three months of 2001 are not yet available, but reports that a large quantity of stored opium left Afghanistan in late September/early October likely mean that opium prices declined toward the end of the year. The leap in the opium price was apparently due largely to the ban on poppy cultivation in Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, which sharply reduced opium production. But effective Iranian drug law enforcement also, no doubt, played a role.

### III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** There are indications of a drug control policy debate in Iran. Over the last several years, the great majority of budgeted expenditures on narcotics went to enforcement. Some voices in Iran are calling for more to be spent on treatment and drug education to reduce demand. These advocates note that up to 60 percent of Iran's growing population of intravenous drug abusers is HIV positive. They also express concern about the sharp increase in deaths attributable to drug abuse. An abrupt and/or large shift in expenditures is unlikely, but the changes in Afghanistan could encourage the continuing policy debate in Iran and contribute to a shift in policy, as heavily armed trafficking and attendant kidnapping of villagers and clashes with Iranian security forces abate.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** The Anti-Narcotics Headquarters coordinates the drug-related activities of the police, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Ministries of Intelligence and Security, Health, and Islamic Guidance and Education.

Iran pursues an aggressive border interdiction effort. A senior Iranian official told the UNDCP that Iran had invested as much as \$800 million in a system of berms, channels, concrete dams, sentry points, and observation towers, as well as a road along the entire eastern border. According to an official GOI Internet site, Iran has installed 212 border posts, 205 observation posts, 22 concrete barriers, 290 km of canals (depth-4m, width-5m), 659 km of soil embankments, a 78 km barbed wire fence, and 2,645 km of asphalt and gravel roads. It also has relocated numerous border villages to newly constructed villages.

Thirty thousand law enforcement personnel are regularly deployed along the border, and Iran reports that more than 3,000 law enforcement officials have been killed in clashes with heavily-armed smugglers during the last two decades. Interdiction efforts by the police and the Revolutionary Guards have resulted in numerous drug seizures. According to the UNDCP, Iranian officials seized 444 metric tons of opiates (opium equivalent) in 2000, and 207 metric tons of opiates (opium equivalent) in 2001. Thus, seizures fell by roughly fifty-four percent in 2001 in comparison to 2000. The sharp decline in seizures, accompanied by a sharp increase in price indicates that much less opium was moving from Afghanistan into Iran during 2001, with tight supplies most evident during the first six-nine months of the year.

Drug offenses are under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts. Punishment for narcotics offenses is severe, with death sentences possible for possession of more than 30 grams of heroin or five kilograms of opium. Those convicted of lesser offenses may be punished with imprisonment, fines, or lashes, although lashing is said to have been used less frequently in recent years. Offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 are afforded some leniency. At the end of 2001 forty-seven percent of the inmates in Iranian prisons were incarcerated for drug offenses, ranging from use to trafficking. There were 83,308 inmates with drug-related convictions at the end of 2001. Primarily as a result of a sharp (36 percent) increase in the number of addicts arrested, narcotics-related arrests in Iran during 2001 increased to 311,984, an increase of almost 16 percent over 2000. Iran has executed more than 10,000 narcotics traffickers in the last decade;

executions continue, but the UNDCP reports that many in Iranian judiciary are questioning the deterrent effect of executions.

**Corruption.** Although there is no indication that senior government officials aid or abet narcotics traffickers, there are periodic reports of corruption among lower-level law enforcement, which is consistent with the transit of multiple-ton drug shipments across Iran. Punishment of corruption appears to be harsh, and the evidence of Iran's commitment to keep drugs from its people is compelling.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Its legislation does not bring it completely into conformity with the Convention, particularly in the areas of money laundering and controlled deliveries. The UNDCP is working with Iran through the NOROUZ Program to modify its laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system. Iran is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and it has signed but not ratified the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. Iran became a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances on August 9, 2000. In addition, Iran has signed bilateral counternarcotics agreements with Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. Iran has shown an increasing desire to cooperate with the international community on counternarcotics matters and recently signed separate quadripartite memoranda of understanding on money laundering and drug control with Armenia, Georgia, and the UNDCP, as well as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the UNDCP. In January 2000, according to press reports, Iranian airport officials visited Cyprus to look into ways to control drug trafficking from Iran to Cyprus. Iran participates with the UNDCP and Pakistan on a reasonably successful project to bolster drug interdiction efforts on the Iran-Pakistan border. Iran is a member of the ten-nation Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which established a counternarcotics center as part of its secretariat. In March, the Iranian permanent envoy to the UN's Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) was elected by a large majority to chair the CND for a one-year term. Under his able leadership, the CND developed a reporting and evaluation program to follow up on commitments made at the 1998 UNGA Special Session on Drugs. Iran has been active participant on counternarcotics issues through the UN's "Six Plus Two" process on Afghanistan, and signed the Six Plus Two Regional Action Plan in September. Iran signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on December 12, 2000.

**Cultivation/Production.** A 1998 U.S. survey of opium poppy cultivation in Iran and a detailed multi-agency assessment concluded that the amount of poppy being grown in Iran was negligible. The survey looked at more than 1.25 million acres in Iran's traditional poppy-growing areas, and found no poppy crops growing there, although the survey could not rule out the possibility of some cultivation in remote areas. A follow-up survey in 1999 reached the same conclusion. The UNDCP office located in Tehran has repeatedly assured the international community since then that poppies are not cultivated in Iran. Thus, the dated U.S. evidence that no poppies are being grown is consistent with Iranian claims and evidence from other concerned countries and the UNDCP.

Iran is generally viewed as a transit country for drugs produced elsewhere, but there are some reports of opium refining near the Turkish/Iranian border. Most refining of the opiates moving through Iran is certainly done elsewhere, either in Afghanistan or in Turkey.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Shipments of opiates enter Iran overland from Pakistan and Afghanistan by camel, donkey, or truck caravans, often organized and protected by heavily armed ethnic Baluch tribesmen from either side of the frontier. Once inside Iran, large shipments are either concealed within ordinary commercial truck cargoes or broken down into smaller sub-shipments. Foreign embassy observers report that Iranian interdiction efforts have disrupted smuggling convoys sufficiently to force smugglers to change tactics and emphasize concealment. The use of human "mules" reportedly is on the rise. Individuals and small groups attempt to cross the border with two to ten kilograms of drugs.

Most of the opiates smuggled into Iran are smuggled to neighboring countries for further processing and transportation to Europe. Turkey is the main processing destination for these opiates, most of which are bound for consumption in Russia and Europe. There is a northern smuggling route through Iran's

Khorasan Province, to Turkmenistan, to Tehran, and then on to Turkey. The mountainous, desert, sparsely settled nature of this route makes it hard to police. Traffickers are frequently well-armed and dangerous. The southern route also passes through sparsely-settled desert terrain on its way to Tehran en route to Turkey; some opiates moving along the southern route detour to Bandar Abbas and move by sea to the Persian Gulf states. Bandar Abbas also appears to be an entry point for precursor chemicals moving to refineries in Afghanistan. Iran does not specifically control precursor chemicals used for producing illicit drugs; however, Iranian Customs seized in excess of 20 metric tons of diverted acetic anhydride (AA), a key precursor for heroin, during 2001. Azerbaijan and Armenia provide alternative routes to Russia and Europe that bypass Turkish interdiction efforts. Additionally, despite the risk of severe punishment, marine transport is used through the Persian Gulf to the nations of the Arabian Peninsula, taking advantage of modern transportation and communication facilities and a laissez faire commercial attitude in that area. Iranian enforcement officials have estimated that as much as 50 percent of the opium produced in Afghanistan in past years entered Iran, with as much as 700-800 tons of opium consumed in Iran itself by 1.8-2 million users (median estimate).

As measured by seizures, the United States is an important destination for drugs mailed from Iran. In 2000, the United States led all other destinations for drugs mailed to a foreign destination, but seized by Iranian authorities in Iran (28 cases, involving seizures of 6.7 kilograms of various drugs, primarily opiates). Canada was the second most common destination, with 5.4 kilograms seized. The UK was the third most common destination, with 4.7 kilograms seized. The amount of drugs moving to all destinations by mail and courier service is miniscule, and seizures of some of these shipments before they leave Iran provide the only evidence of this smuggling method.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** The Government of Iran estimates the number of drug addicts at over 1.3 million, with an additional 600,000 casual drug abusers. However, a physician and member of the national committee against AIDS have estimated that there are 3.3 million addicts. The UNDCP estimates that 1.5 to two percent of a population of 65.6 million (984,000-1,312,000) has a serious drug problem. Ninety-three percent of these are male, with a mean age of 33.4 years (plus or minus 10.5 years), and 1.4 percent (ca. 21,000) are HIV positive. In the past, the Islamic Republic attacked illegal alcohol use with more fervor than drug abuse, and was reluctant to discuss drug problems openly. Since 1995, public awareness campaigns and attention by two successive Iranian presidents as well as cabinet ministers and the parliament have given demand reduction a significant boost. Under the NOROUZ plan, the Government of Iran spent more than \$68 million dollars in the first year for demand reduction and community awareness. The Prevention Department of Iran's Social Welfare Association runs 12 treatment and rehabilitation centers, as well as 39 out-patient treatment programs in all major cities. Some 30,000 people are treated per year, and some programs have three-month waiting lists. Narcotics Anonymous and other self-help programs can be found in almost all districts as well and several NGOs focus on drug demand reduction. There are no methadone treatment or HIV prevention programs, although HIV infection in the prison population is a serious concern.

## IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

In the absence of diplomatic relations with Iran, the United States has no narcotics initiatives in Iran. The U.S. government continues to encourage regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking. Iran and the United States have expressed similar viewpoints on illicit drugs and the regional impact of the Afghan drug trade. In the context of multilateral settings such as the UN's Six Plus Two group, the United States and Iran have worked together productively. Iran nominated the United States to be coordinator of the Six Plus Two counternarcotics initiative.

**The Road Ahead.** The GOI has demonstrated sustained national political will and taken strong measures against illicit narcotics, including cooperation with the international community. Iran's actions support the global effort against international drug trafficking. Iran stands to be one of the major benefactors of any long-term reduction in drug production/trafficking from Afghanistan. The United States anticipates that

Iran will continue to pursue policies and actions in support of efforts to combat drug production and trafficking.

# Israel

## I. Summary

Neither trafficking nor drug production are significant problems in Israel. However, the Israeli National Police report that all the commonly abused drugs are available in Israel and that drug use is on the rise among the nation's youths. Several hundred Israelis are currently involved in international narcotics trafficking worldwide, specifically in the smuggling of MDMA (ecstasy) from Europe to the United States, as well as cocaine trafficking. Israeli authorities stepped up ongoing cooperation with USG officials during 2001 and made dozens of arrests of drug traffickers. The Israel Anti-Drug Authority (ADA) has refocused its domestic programs toward at-risk youth groups.

Israel in 2001 enacted nine sets of regulations to implement anti-money laundering legislation passed in 2000 and plans to have a Money Laundering Authority operational early in 2002. Israel has signed the 1988 UN Drug Convention and plans to ratify it in early 2002. Israeli domestic law already implements the Convention's requirements.

## II. Status of Country

Israeli narcotics trafficking rings have been increasingly involved in the smuggling of ecstasy from its point of production in Europe (primarily the Netherlands) to the U.S. over the past several years. Israeli authorities have been fully cooperative with USG officials, who describe information sharing at an all-time high. During 2001, U.S. DEA officials and Israel National Police authorities worked closely with European counterparts and dozens of arrests of drug traffickers were made. Israeli authorities also allowed DEA officials to participate in several arrests in Israel this year, and extradition proceedings are under way in several cases.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** In May 2001 the Israeli Police Commissioner set up a committee to review drug enforcement policy. The committee is headed by the Deputy Director of the Intelligence Division of the Israel National Police and includes representatives from police investigations, intelligence, and research units, and officials of the ADA and other entities. The committee's report was released at the end of 2001.

**Cultivation/Production.** There is only negligible illicit drug cultivation or production in Israel.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** U.S. DEA officials in Cyprus report that more than two dozen arrests were made this year as a result of three strategic planning meetings held during 2001. These meetings focused on the trafficking of narcotics, specifically ecstasy. Included in those arrested this year was Oded Tuido, the largest ecstasy trafficker known to authorities at the time. Meeting participants included the Israel National Police, U.S. DEA, U.S. Customs, and European security officials. Information sharing with Israeli authorities was higher than ever. The INP opened 17,658 files on drug-related crimes from January to September, a two percent increase over the 17,351 cases opened during the same period last year. This reflects a sharp decline in the ten to 20 percent annual average increase over the past decade. Seizures also were generally down. According to the police, these decreases are a result of the shift of police focus away from drug-related crime to internal security matters during 2001.

This year Israeli Customs authorities participated in several international operations: "Pompidou" on cooperation among airports, "Topaz" on control of chemical substances used for the manufacturing of heroin, and "Sinbad" on surveillance of small sailing vessels in the Mediterranean sea basin. Operation Topaz resulted in the seizure of tens of tons of acetic anhydride abroad (not en route to Israel), which was in transit to illegal laboratories for the purpose of manufacturing heroin. Operation Sinbad resulted in the

seizure of 3.5 tons of hashish in transit from Morocco to Spain. Israeli Customs works with Israeli police and shares intelligence with the World Customs Organization. In May 2001 the Israeli Police Commissioner set up a committee to review drug enforcement policy. The committee's report was released at the end of 2001.

**Corruption.** Israel has had no cases of narcotics-related government corruption, nor is there any explicit or implicit official support for narcotics-related activities. Israel does not have legislation for public corruption specifically relating to narcotics, but it punishes corruption in all government matters when proven.

**Agreements and Treaties.** In 2000 Israel passed legislation against money laundering, clearing the last legal hurdle to ratifying the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The Government of Israel is now completing internal administrative processes to ratify the Convention and plans to complete the process in early 2002. In 1991 the U.S. and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding calling for bilateral cooperation to combat illicit narcotics trafficking and abuse. A dual taxation treaty entered into force between the U.S. and Israel in 1994, which grants U.S. tax authorities limited access to bank account information. Israel is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. A customs mutual assistance agreement and a mutual legal assistance treaty are also in force between Israel and the U.S. In December 2000 Israel signed the UN Convention against Transnational Crime and it is in the process of undergoing the necessary domestic review prior to ratification. In November 2001, Israel also signed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supplementing this convention. Israel is a party to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. Israel is one of 36 parties to the European Treaty on Extradition and has separate extradition treaties with several other countries, including the U.S. Under the Israeli extradition law, as recently amended, all persons, whether citizens or not, may be extradited for purposes of standing trial for extraditable offences. If the requested person was both a citizen and resident of Israel at the time the offence was committed, he may be extradited to trial abroad only if the state seeking extradition promises in advance to allow the person to return to Israel to serve any sentence imposed. Israel is party to a number of other bilateral and multilateral agreements that allow for extradition and asset seizure. Israel cooperates with the UNDCP.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Most drugs imported to Israel are consumed domestically. Israel is not a major drug flow/transit country, although Israelis play a considerable role in international drug trafficking networks in source, transit, and distribution countries. Israeli Customs seized 1.9 kilograms of cannabis, 31.9 grams of opium and heroin, 2 kilograms of cocaine, 206 ecstasy pills, 2,055 LSD stamps, and 391 grams of other unspecified substances at ports of entry during the first nine months of 2001.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** The ADA sets Israeli drug policy, and works in the areas of prevention, education, public awareness, treatment, and rehabilitation. Many other entities take part in the fight against drug use, including youth movements, sports organizations, kibbutzim, and NGOs. The ADA budget was cut from approximately U.S. \$9.5 million during 2000 to approximately U.S. \$8 million for 2001, due to overall budget cuts in Israel. According to the ADA, there are 200,000-250,000 drug users in Israel. Of those, some 20,000-25,000 are heroin addicts. ADA officials remain concerned about increasing use of recreational drugs (primarily ecstasy) among the nation's youth. The ADA launched a national public campaign against ecstasy during 2001. The ADA continues to focus its efforts toward youth generally considered high risk (new immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia, Israeli Arabs, and "detached" youths, i.e., dropouts). ADA programs for youths include peer counseling, sports and other recreational activities, and a new computer program currently being adopted for school use. These programs are designed to prevent delinquency, create "alternatives" for youths, and to teach "life skills," as well as "the ability to say no."

The ADA launched a new program for drug-addicted women during 2001 which is showing positive results. It has also initiated an experimental program for users of hallucinogenic substances who have

mental disorders as a result of drug abuse. The ADA is also beginning a new program to increase awareness within the country's Arab sector, where it reports a relatively high percentage of drug abuse.

### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

**The Road Ahead.** DEA officials were pleased with the arrests and seizures made during 2001 and intend to further crack down on ecstasy and cocaine trafficking rings through increased cooperation. USG and Israeli authorities will continue to conduct strategy sessions throughout 2002. The USG will also seek to increase extradition activities during 2002. Some Israeli enforcement personnel attended U.S. training during 2001, and joint training opportunities should also be available in the future.

# Jordan

## I. Summary

Jordan's domestic drug abuse problem remains small due largely to the active enforcement of existing laws, and cultural and religious norms which help limit the use of illegal drugs. Jordan remains a transit country for drugs due to its pivotal location between drug-producing countries to the north, and drug-consuming countries to the south and west. Cooperation between Jordan and neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon and Syria, is ongoing and robust. Cooperation with Israel decreased significantly due to ongoing Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and looks forward to working closely with the EU and the United States on drug transit issues.

## II. Status of Country

There are no obvious indicators to suggest Jordan will move from a narcotics transit country to a narcotics producing country in the foreseeable future. The modest amount of drug seizures and drug use reported seem to support this assessment.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** In December 1999, Jordanian officials announced a government wide project entitled "The National Plan to Combat Drugs and Psychotropic Substances." The duration of the project was originally scheduled from 1999 through 2001. An extension to include the year 2002 was recently announced with an estimated budget for Jordan of U.S. \$3 million. The plan encompasses three main objectives: prevention, enforcement, and treatment.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Jordan's Public Security Directorate maintains an active Anti-Narcotics and Counterfeiting Bureau. In an effort to enhance enforcement, this bureau added an additional 14 officers in 2001, bringing the total of counternarcotics officers to approximately 250. To prepare for better treatment and prevention measures, the unit's deputy director attended a Canadian-sponsored conference geared toward the challenges of treatment.

Law enforcement and drug policy officials report an increase in the amount of hashish seized in Jordan for 2001. Officials attribute this success to the tough enforcement by the Public Security Directorate's Anti-Narcotics and Counterfeiting Bureau. Members of this bureau cite a very close working relationship with Lebanon, the purported source country, to eradicate hashish trafficking. Further, bureau members report a vigorous, cooperative, and ongoing drug enforcement effort with Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Statistics provided by enforcement officials for 2001 indicate more than a doubling in seizures of cannabis (from approximately 300 kilograms in 2000 to approximately 800 kilograms in 2001). They attribute this increase in seizures to the cooperative efforts between Lebanon and Jordan. These same Jordanian officials hope to further enhance their existing counternarcotics agreement with Turkish enforcement officials and improve efforts to combat the trafficking of opium and heroin.

**Corruption.** Jordanian officials report no narcotics-related corruption or corruption investigations during the past year. There is currently no evidence to suggest that senior officials are involved in narcotics trafficking.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Jordan remains committed to existing bilateral agreements providing for counternarcotics cooperation with Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt,

Pakistan, and Hungary. Although the United States views a 1995 bilateral extradition treaty as being in force, Jordan has failed to honor any U.S. extradition requests since a 1997 Jordanian Court of Cassation (Appeals-Level Court) ruling that the Jordanian Parliament had not properly approved the treaty. The United States has repeatedly urged Jordan to rectify any impediments to implementation of the treaty. Jordan is a party to the World Customs Organization's International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation, and Repression of Customs Offenses (Nairobi Convention), Annex X on Assistance in Narcotic Cases.

**Cultivation/Production.** Existing laws prohibit the cultivation or production of narcotics in Jordan. These laws have been effectively enforced, aided by Jordan's desert climate which precludes the cultivation of many plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Jordan remains a transit country for illicit drugs. Jordan's most challenging burden remains the long, open, and often desolate borders with neighboring countries to the north. While law enforcement sources point to robust and effective enforcement efforts with Syria and Lebanon, the vast array of nomadic tribes associated with trafficking often eludes the most sophisticated efforts of interdiction. None of the drugs that transit Jordan are believed to be destined for the United States.

Statistics for 2001 reveal a reduction in the amount of opium and heroin that transits Jordan. Cannabis seizures have increased. These seizures have been due in large part to the efforts of Lebanon and Jordan to cooperate fully on cross border issues. Statistics also reveal continued seizures of captagon tablets (an amphetamine-type stimulant) destined for Saudi Arabia. In the past, transit problems to Israel were prevalent, but the ongoing hostilities in Israel have provided very limited opportunity for cooperation with Israeli authorities, so it is uncertain what drugs might still move in that direction.

**Precursor Chemical Control.** There are no reports on the production of precursor or essential chemical control agents in Jordan. There were no reported seizures or smuggling of pre-cursor chemicals in Jordan during 2001. The Jordanian Government does have in place a reasonable system of controls on precursor chemicals, and works closely with its neighbors and major trading partners to counter any attempts at diversion.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** The Ministry of Education and Health makes presentations to school-age youths, conducts awareness briefings, and produces lecture materials on prevention, awareness, and addiction. In 2001, the Ministry opened the National Rehabilitation Center. The new treatment facility in Shafra Beida, a suburb of Amman, has 60 beds available for treatment.

As always, cultural and religious norms are an important factor in drug use. The counternarcotics unit is committed to providing information on illicit narcotics to the Ministry of Moslem Affairs and Holy Places, which directs religious speeches, lessons, and lectures on awareness of drugs and their effects.

## IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**Policy Initiatives.** The Jordanian government is committed to its efforts, highlighted in the National Anti-Drug Plan, to combat drugs and psychotropic substances. Counternarcotics officials report that the government is also committed to prevention, treatment, and enforcement as a general policy to combat the use and spread of drugs.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** Jordan's Anti-Narcotics and Counterfeiting Bureau has a close working relationship with the DEA's country attaché in Cyprus.

**The Road Ahead.** The United States expects continued cooperation with Jordanian enforcement and policy officials on counternarcotics matters, and is confident in Jordan's initiatives and efforts to creatively implement Jordan's own national strategy to combat drugs of abuse.

## Kenya

### I. Summary

Kenya is a transit country for heroin and hashish, mostly en route from Southwest Asia and headed for Europe and North America. The quality of heroin transiting Kenya has increased in recent years and is destined increasingly for North America. The exact impact that heroin transiting Kenya is having on the U.S. market is unclear, since specific quantities are unknown. Cannabis/marijuana is grown clandestinely and illegally imported from neighboring countries for domestic consumption. There is a small local heroin market. Airline passenger profiling and other techniques continue to help reduce airborne heroin shipments. Interdiction of narcotics shipments by sea has been less successful, but a program for profiling shipping containers is in effect. The Kenyan government has approved a long-awaited national drug control master plan. The Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU) of the Kenyan police continues to cooperate well with international and regional counternarcotics officials. Although government officials profess strong support for counternarcotics efforts, the overall program suffers from a lack of resources. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has enacted full implementing legislation.

### II. Status of Country

Kenya is an important transit country and a minor producer of narcotics. The quantities of heroin and hashish transiting Kenya, thought to have a relatively small impact on the United States, were on the rise in recent years, but diminished in 2001. Cannabis or marijuana is produced illegally in commercial quantities for the domestic market with there being no evidence that this production has a major impact on the United States. Small quantities of cocaine and other drugs originating outside Africa transit Kenya for consumers in Southern Africa.

Kenya's sea and air transportation infrastructure, and the network of commercial and family ties that link some Kenyans to Southwest Asia, make Kenya a important transit country for Southwest Asian heroin. In 2000, officials noted a dramatic shift from low-purity brown heroin to higher-purity white heroin, and believe that the higher-purity product is destined principally for the United States. This trend continued in 2001. Officials now believe that the United States is at least as significant as Europe as a destination for heroin transiting Kenya. It is difficult to estimate the quantities of heroin reaching the United States through Kenya and therefore to assess its impact on the United States. In recent years, Kenya has been an important transit point for Southwest Asian cannabis resin (hashish), and police made several multi-ton hashish seizures in recent years. However, hashish seizures fell off significantly in 2001. Cocaine seizures were also sharply down in 2001. Kenya does not produce significant quantities of precursor chemicals.

### III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** In April 2001, the Kenyan Cabinet approved a national drug control master plan in April 2001. The plan is expected to go before the parliament soon to be enacted. A key element of this plan is the identification of a senior civil servant to liaise with donors and to coordinate a broad counternarcotics effort, including a much-expanded preventative education campaign. This would allow the ANU to concentrate on its interdiction mandate. Regular meetings and information sharing between Kenyan, Ugandan, Tanzanian, and Rwandan narcotics officials continued in 2001. This regional cooperation was advanced in 2001 with the establishment of an East African Community Protocol on combating drug trafficking in the East African region, which Kenya has ratified. Regular meetings among Kenyan counternarcotics authorities also improved internal information sharing and operational coordination between various government agencies, airlines, and other entities. In 2001, Kenyan police officers observed cannabis eradication operations in Uganda and participated in an exchange program on

airport counternarcotics operations with their Tanzanian and Ugandan counterparts. The ANU officers also have continued a program of outreach to judges and magistrates, conducting seminars on counternarcotics law and the full spectrum of narcotics issues. The ANU continued to publicize its message effectively through local media. The ANU also engages in efforts to raise public awareness on drug abuse by giving lectures at schools and to local groups. Aside from crop eradication programs, Kenya has no crop substitution or alternative development initiatives for progressive elimination of the cultivation of marijuana/cannabis. The ANU remains the focus of Kenyan counternarcotics efforts.

**Accomplishments.** Many ANU officers have undergone training, much of it through the UNDCP and bilateral programs sponsored primarily by the U.S., German, British, and Japanese governments. The ANU and the Kenyan Customs Service now have a cadre of officers proficient in profiling and searching suspected drug couriers and containers at airports and seaports. There have been some good results with profiling at airports, although generally with respect to couriers rather than major traffickers. Results at seaports have been modest. The ANU continues to build its surveillance capabilities and is able to carry out increasingly sophisticated operations. Inadequate resources, a problem throughout the Kenyan police force, significantly reduce the ANU's operational effectiveness.

The ANU cooperates with the United States and other nations on counternarcotics investigations and other operations.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Kenya seized 18.17 kilograms of heroin in 2001 (all statistics on drug seizures in this section reflect the period from January to September 2001) and arrested 117 people on heroin-related charges. This amount is a reduction from seizures last year, though the number of arrests nearly doubled from last year's figure. Officials report a sharp shift from lower-quality brown heroin to higher-quality white heroin, and report that much of the white heroin transiting Kenya is destined for the United States where traffickers are hoping to gain larger profits. Most couriers arrested in Kenya conceal heroin by swallowing it, though some also hide it in their shoes. The ANU concentrates its anti-heroin operations at Kenya's two international airports.

In a dramatic drop, Kenyan authorities seized only 21 kilograms of hashish in 2001 compared to the 4,715 kilograms that were seized in 2000. Four arrests were made during these seizures. Officials believe Kenyan coastal waters and ports are major transit points for the shipment of hashish from Pakistan to Europe and North America.

2001 marked a significant drop from last year in cocaine seizures. A total of only seven grams of cocaine were seized and four people arrested. The cocaine seized in Kenya is believed to originate from Brazil and Colombia, though its availability and abuse in Kenya is not widespread. Police also arrested one suspect for possession of the psychotropic drug Diazepam.

Kenyan authorities seized 381,085.68 kilograms of cannabis in 2001, and arrested 2,667 individuals. The increase in seizures is attributed to focused operations in the Mt. Kenya region, a major cultivation area. In a week-long operation, police destroyed 14 farms along with 328,362 kilograms of cannabis leaves.

The ANU continued to operate roadblocks for domestic drug trafficking interdiction and is pursuing a variety of policy initiatives for more effective coordination with other government agencies.

**Corruption.** Corruption remains a significant barrier to effective narcotics enforcement. Despite Kenya's strict narcotics law, which encompasses most forms of narcotics-related corruption, there are continued but unconfirmed reports of public officials being involved in narcotics trafficking. Police frequently complain that the courts are ineffective in handling narcotics cases, although it is not clear whether this is a result of corruption, misunderstanding of the law, or simple judicial backlog. More broadly, anticorruption efforts are an integral part of an economic recovery program that was negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 2000, leading to significant prosecutions that year. However, this effort faltered by 2001 when the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court and was dissolved. The future of Kenya's anticorruption initiatives did not appear promising at year's end.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which it implemented in 1994 with the enactment of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Act. In 2000 Kenya's National Assembly ratified the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Kenya is also a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda negotiated a protocol to enhance regional counternarcotics cooperation in 2001. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty remains in force between the United States and Kenya through a 1965 exchange of notes.

Under a 1991 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), amended in 1996, the U.S. donated surveillance and computer equipment to the ANU in 1997. The MOU also provides for sharing of narcotics-related information. The United States and Kenya signed another MOU in 2000 to cover the donation of motorcycles, computers, and related equipment to the ANU. The United States has prepared an amendment to the current MOU in which it seeks to increase its assistance to the ANU.

**Cultivation/Production.** A significant number of Kenyan farmers illegally grow cannabis or marijuana on a commercial basis for the domestic market. Fairly large-scale cannabis cultivation occurs in the Lake Victoria basin, in the central highlands around Mt. Kenya, and along the coast. Foreign tourists export small amounts of Kenyan marijuana. Officials continue to conduct aerial surveys to identify significant cannabis-producing areas in cooperation with the Kenya Wildlife Service. The State Department did not provide funding for the application of aerial herbicides in 2001, and no aerial eradication efforts were undertaken.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Kenya is strategically located along a major transit route between Southwest Asian producers of heroin and markets in Europe and North America. In 2001, the amount of heroin seized in Kenya decreased for the first time in four years, although the number of arrests increased from last year's figures. Heroin normally transits Kenya by air, carried by individual couriers. West Africans, South Asians, and East Africans remain active couriers. However, the ANU reports a trend of European couriers trafficking in heroin transiting Kenya to Europe and North America. Once in Kenya, heroin is typically delivered to agents of West African crime syndicates.

The police continue to notice a dramatic shift in heroin trafficking from low-purity brown heroin to high-purity white heroin. Officials attribute the increasing amount of white heroin to increased processing capabilities in Pakistan and Afghanistan during 2001. Officials also say that the shift from brown to white heroin has been accompanied by a shift from the European to the North American market.

Local, regional, and international counternarcotics officials are also paying closer attention to maritime transport of heroin, though no seizures were made from this source in 2001. There is also evidence that poor policing along the East African coast makes this region attractive to maritime smugglers. Kenya's neighbor Somalia has a long coastline and no functioning government. Kenya also has very few maritime interdiction resources.

Postal and commercial courier services are also used for narcotics shipments through Kenya. In the past, Kenya has been a transit country for methaqualone (Mandrax) en route from India to South Africa. Between 1996 and 2000, there had been no Mandrax seizures in Kenya. However, this changed in 2001 when 52,103 Mandrax tablets were intercepted and seven suspects arrested. One person was arrested for possession of the psychotropic substance of Diazepam.

Officials have never identified any clandestine airstrips in Kenya used for drug deliveries and believe that no such airstrips exist.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** Kenya has made some progress in efforts to institute programs for demand reduction. Illegal cannabis and a locally abused mild narcotic called "Khat" are the domestic drugs of choice. Heroin abuse is limited generally to members of the economic elite and a slightly broader range of users on the coast. Solvent abuse is widespread (and highly visible) among street children in Nairobi and other urban centers. There are no reliable statistics on domestic consumption of illicit narcotics.

Demand reduction efforts have largely been limited to publicity campaigns sponsored by private donors and a UNDCP project to bring counternarcotics education into the schools. In 2001, however, the Government of Kenya appointed a National Coordinator for the Campaign Against Drug Abuse to initiate national public education programs on drugs. There are no special government rehabilitation or drug abuse treatment facilities, but some churches and NGOs provide limited rehabilitation and treatment programs for solvent-addicted street children.

### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**Bilateral Cooperation and Accomplishments.** The principal U.S. counternarcotics objective in Kenya is to interdict the flow of narcotics to the United States. The USG seeks to accomplish this objective through law enforcement cooperation, the encouragement of a strong Kenyan government commitment to narcotics interdiction and efforts to strengthen Kenyan counternarcotics capabilities.

There was a modest expansion of U.S. bilateral cooperation with Kenya and surrounding countries on counternarcotics matters in 2001. The U.S. provided the ANU with four motorcycles and will be providing computers and related equipment to this unit in the coming year. The United States also took over local chairmanship of the Mini-Dublin Group, which has responsibility for coordinating counternarcotics assistance to Kenya from several Western donors.

The United States is in the process of seeking an amendment to the MOU it signed with the Government of Kenya in 2000 to provide increased assistance to the ANU. Once signed, this amendment will allow the U.S. to assist the ANU to improve its airport interdiction efforts and to combat corruption.

**The Road Ahead.** The USG will continue to take advantage of its good relations with Kenyan law enforcement authorities to enhance professionalism, operational capacity, and information sharing. Nairobi is also an ideal venue for conducting regional training and launching other regional initiatives. The USG will actively seek ways to maximize counternarcotics efforts both in Kenya and throughout East Africa. Perhaps most significantly, the USG will work with local, regional, and international partners to better understand and combat the flow of international narcotics, particularly heroin, through Kenya to the United States.

# Lebanon

## I. Summary

Lebanon is not a major illicit drug producing or drug-transit country, although it remains a country of concern to the U.S. During 2001 there was a significant increase in hashish cultivation. Although the Government of Lebanon (GOL), in cooperation with Syrian authorities, was successful in suppressing the cultivation of illicit opium and cannabis crops in the Biqa' Valley from 1992-2000, the resumption of cannabis cultivation during 2001 is likely attributable the lack of suitable alternative crops to sustain the livelihoods of local farmers at a time of growing economic uncertainty. There was minimal poppy cultivation in 2001. There is practically no illicit drug refining in Lebanon. Drug trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border has diminished substantially as a result of Lebanese and Syrian efforts to deter smuggling activity. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

The deteriorating economic situation in Lebanon—especially in the agricultural sector—led to a resurgence of hashish cultivation by farmers in the Biqa' Valley in 2001. There were also minor instances of poppy cultivation. Neither the GOL nor the Syrian authorities in the area made any efforts to deter cultivation in the spring of 2001 or to eradicate the resulting crop before the summer harvest. However, in November, the government launched an counternarcotics campaign to discourage new planting. Occasionally producers of illicit crops have shot at strangers who were perceived to be threatening their fields; in June, shots were fired at a CNN team attempting to film cannabis crops.

Approximately 4,010 hectares of land were used for hashish production. In 2000, the Judiciary Police—the law enforcement agency tasked with counternarcotics responsibilities—destroyed opium poppy crops in several areas of the Biqa' Valley. They performed no eradication in 2001, but illicit cultivation remained very limited.

Five types of drugs are available in Lebanon: hashish, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and other synthetics, such as MDMA (ecstasy). Although hashish and heroin are no longer widely available in large quantities, small quantities continue to be available for local consumption.

Lebanon is not a major transit country for illicit drug traffickers, and most trafficking is done by “amateurs,” rather than major drug networks. Marijuana and opium derivatives are trafficked to a modest extent in the region, but there is no evidence that the illicit narcotics that transit Lebanon reach the U.S. in sufficient amounts to have a significant effect on the U.S. South American cocaine is smuggled into Lebanon primarily via air and sea routes from Europe, Jordan, and Syria. Lebanese nationals living in South America in concert with resident Lebanese traffickers often finance these operations. Synthetics are smuggled into Lebanon primarily for sale to high-income recreational users.

There is no significant illicit drug refining in Lebanon; such activity has practically disappeared due to vigilance of the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Small amounts of precursor chemicals, however, shipped from Lebanon to Turkey via Syria, are diverted for illicit use. Legislation passed in 1998 authorized seizure of assets if a drug trafficking nexus is established in court proceedings.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Neither the Lebanese government nor the Syrian government (which maintains security control over the Biqa' Valley) took any actions to prevent illicit cannabis cultivation in 2001. Although Lebanese Interior Minister Elias Murr sent a circular in May to local government officials advising them that failure to report illicit cannabis and opium cultivation in their areas could subject them

to prosecution, there was no follow up, and there have been no prosecutions. However, in November, prior to the poppy-sowing season, the government launched a coordinated campaign to discourage farmers from cultivating illicit crops, and began planning for their eradication. Interior Minister Murr announced a zero-tolerance policy for poppy cultivation and opium/heroin production. The government has continued to support counternarcotics initiatives in coordination with international organizations and other countries through training and program participation.

**Accomplishments.** The government launched a public awareness advertising campaign in 2001 to discourage drug use and introduced a recently approved civics textbook for use in all public schools, which contains a chapter on narcotics. In December, the Ministry of Health established a system for ensuring that precursor chemicals imported into Lebanon for licit purposes would not be diverted to illicit uses.

In addition to its unilateral efforts, from 1994-2001 the GOL worked with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the FAO on a crop substitution and rural development program in the Baalbek-Hermel area. Over the period of the program, UNDP provided about one-third of the funds (an estimated \$4.7 million) used in Lebanon's Integrated Rural Development Program for Baalbek and Hermel. The UNDP operated six healthcare centers and provided loans and vocational training for farmers, but funding for the program ran out in October 2001. Farmers in the Biqa' Valley reportedly had been dissatisfied with the crop substitution program. During the year, local political figures exerted political pressure on the government to ignore the resurgence of narcotics cultivation. Given the continuing agricultural crisis in the country, and considering that development funds remain limited, impoverished farmers will likely continue to cultivate illicit cannabis, and there is a danger of a return to illicit opium cultivation, unless serious deterrence measures and/or meaningful development alternatives are made available.

**Law Enforcement and Transit Cooperation.** Lebanese security services coordinate with their international counterparts. The Judiciary Police report that close governmental cooperation exists with the major transit countries, particularly those in Europe. The Lebanese military also closely coordinates its activities against drug traffickers with its Syrian counterpart.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** There is a growing recognition among Lebanese leaders of the need to address the problem of illicit drug use. During the year, the government launched a widespread public awareness campaign to discourage drug use. Textbooks approved for use in all public schools contain a chapter on narcotics to increase public awareness. There are several detoxification programs but the only entity in Lebanon that offers a comprehensive drug rehabilitation program is Oum al-Nour (ON), a Beirut-based NGO. The Government provides 40 to 50 percent of ON's yearly budget, which is projected at \$947,000 for 2002. In addition, the organization receives support from Lebanon's Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Public Health. ON estimates that the age of Lebanon's drug addicts has steadily decreased since the end of the country's civil war in 1990, with pre-college and college-age youth now being the most vulnerable. ON statistics cite that the most commonly abused illicit substance is heroin, but use of "designer" drugs such as methamphetamine and ecstasy is present and possibly rising.

ON operates three drug treatment centers in Lebanon, two for men and one for women. The centers, which have a total capacity of 40 patients, offer a year-long residential program; they are currently operating above capacity. While the treatment facilities for hard-core addicts are adequate, the organization lacks out-patient care for individuals whose addictions do not necessarily warrant hospitalization.

ON also engages in drug prevention activities such as distributing counternarcotics paraphernalia on college campuses and promoting drug awareness among the population through advertisements and education programs.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** During 2001 the GOL seized 307.82 kilograms of hashish, 7.28 kilograms of opium, 13.2 kilograms of heroin, 7.68 kilograms of cocaine, and 39 grams of cocaine base. In 2001, 1,182 persons were arrested on charges related to narcotics cultivation, production, transportation, or distribution. In 2001, Lebanese, British, and Egyptian law enforcement authorities cooperated in counternarcotics law enforcement operations.

**Corruption.** Corruption remains endemic in Lebanon up to the senior level of government. While low-level corruption in the counternarcotics forces is possible, there is no evidence of wide scale corruption within the Judiciary Police or the Internal Security Force, which appear to be genuinely dedicated to combating the war on drugs.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Lebanon and the United States have no formal bilateral agreements addressing the issues of narcotics trafficking or extradition. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention.

**Cultivation and Production.** According to a reliable local expert, approximately 4,010 hectares of land are used for hashish production; minimal land was dedicated to poppy production. There was no eradication of illicit crops during 2001. According to the same local expert, an estimated 238,900 metric tons of hashish was produced in 2001.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Illicit drug trafficking via traditional smuggling routes has been curtailed by joint Syrian-Lebanese operations, but nonetheless continues. Drug trafficking along the Israel-Lebanon border has been negligible since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and the subsequent near-sealing of the border. Despite the government's efforts, however, the flow of illicit narcotics into and out of Lebanon continues—much of it through Syria. The primary route for smuggling hashish from Lebanon during 2001 was overland through Syria and Jordan to Egypt and other destinations in Europe and the Middle East. It is unlikely that any significant quantities are being smuggled into the United States. The GOL has conceded in the past that small quantities of morphine and heroin are smuggled overland from Turkey for local use.

#### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**U.S. Policy Initiatives.** In meetings with Lebanese officials, U.S. officials continue to stress the need for diligence in preventing the production and transportation of narcotics, and the need for a comprehensive development program for the Bika' Valley that would provide the impoverished residents with alternate sources of income. The USG also stresses the importance of anticorruption efforts. USAID, in close cooperation with the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, continues its four-component program to aid and empower key Lebanese stakeholders, local government, media, and civil society in their efforts to fight corruption. On the supply side, USAID assists U.S. and local NGOs to work with villages to promote the substitution of illicit crops with legitimate, economically viable ones.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** Lebanon and the United States cooperate in counternarcotics law enforcement efforts and the USG assists the GOL by providing drug-related intelligence, when available and appropriate.

**The Road Ahead.** Given the level of Syrian involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs, success in combating narcotics cultivation and trafficking depends on the will of both the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Although Syria from 1992 until 2000 demonstrated a commitment to counternarcotics actions in Lebanon, in 2001 it made no efforts to deter cultivation or to eradicate illicit cultivation. Nonetheless, the Governments of Lebanon and Syria appear determined to eradicate any illicit cultivation during 2002. The GOL, however, has not successfully developed a socio-economic strategy to tackle the problem of crop substitution. The USG will continue to press the GOL to maintain its commitment to combating drug production and transit and implementing its anticorruption policies.

# Lesotho

## I. Summary

Lesotho is not a major producer of narcotics or precursor chemicals, nor does it have drug processing laboratories. High quality marijuana is cultivated in the country's mountainous, rural areas and is smuggled to major cities in South Africa, but is not smuggled outside the region, with the possible exception of some shipments to Europe. Lesotho suffers from the impact of South Africa-based organized crime, mainly in the areas of livestock and motor vehicle theft and armed robbery, against which most of the country's scarce police resources are deployed. Domestic narcotics abuse is not a serious social problem.

## II. Status of Country

**Treaties and Agreements.** Lesotho is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. It has also approved the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Counternarcotics Protocol. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty remains in force between the United States and Lesotho. In December 2000, Lesotho signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

Lesotho is concerned about the possible impact of organized crime, but its highest priorities in that regard are livestock and motor vehicle theft, both of which were the subject of new laws enacted by Parliament during 2000. Another high profile problem was dealt with by the passage of the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offenses Act in August 1999. A clear law prohibiting corruption is just the first step. Lesotho strives to enforce all its law, but resources—both human and material—are frequently unavailable. The USG is not aware of any involvement of senior officials in drug-related corruption. Payments to facilitate passage of contraband goods to lower officials at border crossing points might occur, and could facilitate drug trafficking. The GOL would no doubt prosecute any case that would come to the attention of authorities under the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offenses Act. The Government of Lesotho has continued to try to staff the investigating body provided for by that legislation and to study further and adopt the best practices of SADC partners against public corruption, although resources for these activities are limited. Lesotho's scarce law enforcement resources have been stretched to the limit dealing with Livestock and motor vehicle theft, and the country has thus far been unable to develop a master plan consistent with the terms of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. A task force working in the Attorney General's Office is evaluating additional laws based on models prepared by the UNDCP for implementing the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**Bilateral Cooperation.** Lesotho sent three participants to the U.S.-sponsored Regional Key Leaders Forum that was held in Gaborone April 24-25. The Government of Lesotho wants to augment its institutional capacity to better fight crime, and has designated four candidates to participate in the International Law Enforcement Academy's (ILEA) Executive Development Program, to be held in Gaborone from January 28 to March 8, 2002.

**The Road Ahead.** Lesotho and other Southern African countries should continue to benefit from the presence of the ILEA in Gaborone.

# Madagascar

## I. Summary

Madagascar is a producer of cannabis. Several provinces produce for local use but there are growing reports of illicit export to neighboring islands of the southwestern area of the Indian Ocean, including Comoros, Reunion, Mauritius, and Seychelles. There is no production or abuse of any synthetic drugs. The Government of Madagascar (GOM) has been involved in regional and international counternarcotics efforts for at least two decades. The GOM has drafted a bill to fight drug abuse and transshipments. Madagascar is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Cannabis is the chief object of both illicit drug abuse and trafficking. However, a recent GOM report indicated that no study has ever been done to determine the extent of drug abuse in Madagascar. Cannabis is cultivated clandestinely, sometimes over very large expanses, particularly in the northwest and far south of the country. Police reports to the media regularly highlight seizures of cannabis (up to hundreds of tons at a time) and arrests of producers and middlemen. Antananarivo, the capital city, with its 1.5 million inhabitants, a large proportion aged under 25, is the most fertile area for drug abuse. Poor communication, the extensive size of the country, lack of law enforcement resources, and probably corruption are the main obstacles to applying the existing laws.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

Madagascar is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotics, and the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 UN Single Convention. Authorities try to fulfill Madagascar's obligations under these conventions. Madagascar has signed the United Nations Convention against Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. In 1998, the GOM created a Joint Ministerial Commission headed by the Prime Minister to draft a National Master Plan against Drugs. It comprises short-term, medium-term, and long-term actions. The draft has been finalized, but the GOM has not yet passed the bill that would implement the Master Plan. The same commission deplored that despite the increase in drug traffic, previous bills have not been enacted.

Cultivation and production are localized. Most shipments that are seized are smuggled in other goods along surface routes. Small quantities of cannabis have been seized in airports. Despite reports of offshore shipments using traditional canoes or small motorboats, very few seizures have been made at sea.

Madagascar has good working relationships with Comoros Island, other neighboring islands, and some multilateral organizations (e.g., the International Police Technical Cooperation Service). Madagascar also takes part in the network of Eastern and Southern African police agencies combating drug abuse and trafficking.

In a report issued in July 2001, the Joint Ministry Commission reported that close to 180 tons of cannabis were seized in 2000. In addition, 789,642 plants of cannabis were destroyed. Some 657 people were arrested for involvement with planting, selling, and consuming cannabis. Provisional figures for 2001 are up significantly; seizures by the Gendarmerie through November total 993 tons.

**Corruption.** In 1999, Madagascar passed a law against corruption (bribery) but the authorities do not actively enforce it. Furthermore, the law does not apply to senior government officials. Thus, it would seem to be a non-factor in the effort against narcotics-related corruption.

Madagascar does not encourage illicit production of narcotic or psychotropic drugs. It does not encourage the laundering or proceeds from illegal drug transactions. To the USG's knowledge, senior officials do not encourage the illicit production and distribution of such drugs, nor do they encourage the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

**Drug Transit.** Because of the vulnerability of the control along the 5,000 kilometers of coastline, Madagascar risks becoming a drug transit country, not only for cannabis, but also for psychotropic drugs. Malagasy authorities say they cannot rule out the possibility that heroin and cocaine transit Madagascar, but they have no specific information (even anecdotal).

**Domestic Programs.** Collaboration with the United Nations resulted in the launching in 2000 of a "Sports Against Drugs" project in the capital city. This project continued for 2001 and will be expanded to other regions in the coming years.

# Malawi

## I. Summary

Drug trafficking and abuse are on the rise in Malawi. Though limited primarily to marijuana, Malawi appears to play a role in the illegal drug trade of southern Africa. As a result, the GOM is taking steps to halt the illegal activity before it increases further.

## II. Status of Country

Drug trafficking in Malawi is limited primarily to locally grown marijuana. The Dangerous Drug Unit (DDU) of the Malawi Police Service reports 819 seizures (nearly 60,000 kilograms) of the illegal substance from January to October 2001. Investigations surrounding the seizures resulted in 835 arrests. There was one seizure of cocaine weighing 250 grams; no arrests were made. These statistics indicate an increase in trafficking activity in comparison to the same period last year. Most of the marijuana cultivated in Malawi is destined for countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Concern over the abuse of marijuana in Malawi is growing. Though most of the crop is cultivated for regional shipment, sufficient amounts enter the local markets to get the attention of the GOM. The National Drug Control Commission met twice in 2001 to assess the effects of abuse in Malawi. Their report indicated a rise in violence, crime, and health-related problems as a result of marijuana abuse.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** The GOM, with UNDCP and SADC assistance, is currently working on a National Drug Master Plan (NDMP), to include updating legislation pertaining to illegal drug activity. The NDMP is scheduled for completion in December 2001, with hopes the GOM will approve the plan in February 2002.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Malawi is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. Although limited by a lack of resources, the GOM is striving to meet the goals of the 1988 UN Drug Convention wherever possible. This can most readily be seen in the efforts of the DDU, work on the NDMP, and regional cooperation with SADC. Malawi has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty remains in force between the United States and Malawi through a 1966-1967 exchange of notes.

## **Mauritius**

Mauritius is not a major producer, exporter, or consumer of illicit drugs. Although drug production on the island is confined to cannabis, the number of plants seized has increased steadily over the last several years. The year 2001 also saw a dramatic increase in the amount of heroin seized, thanks largely to the record-breaking seizure of over 15 kilograms of heroin in November 2001. The Dangerous Drug Act was approved on December 5, 2001. The Act gives the Anti-Drug and Smuggling Unit (ADSU), the primary Mauritian drug interdiction force, considerably more legal tools with which to pursue drug smugglers.

Mauritius is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, which it ratified on March 6, 2001. Mauritius is also a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In December 2000, Mauritius signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The 250-person ADSU within the National Police Force is primarily responsible for investigations and enforcement relating to narcotics laws, although a 37-member "Flying Squad" also carries out enforcement activities. The ADSU has implemented a cooperation agreement with its counterpart in India, and continues to develop cooperative arrangements with its Southern African Development Community (SADC) partners pursuant to the SADC Protocol on Illicit Drug Trafficking. Relations with the U.S. DEA are good. Destruction of cannabis plants has risen steadily over the last several years. More disturbing, however, has been the dramatic spike in heroin seizures, a trend that strongly suggests Mauritius is increasingly being used as a drug transshipment point.

Through the end of November 2001, over 24 kilograms of heroin had been seized, a substantial jump in activity from the 5.9 kilograms seized in 2000. In the first six months of 2001, over 56 kilograms of cannabis were seized, an obvious jump from the 21.9 kilogram figure from 2000. Seizures of hashish also rose, with 15.2 grams having been seized through the first six months of 2001, compared to 6.7 grams in 2000.

The government provides drug education and demand reduction programs and supports similar projects undertaken by NGOs. ADSU has discontinued its preparation of a counternarcotics master plan, based on the argument that narcotics abuse is not a major issue for Mauritius. Corruption is moderate by regional standards, and does not appear to affect counternarcotics efforts. The United States periodically provides training for Mauritian law enforcement authorities, and two ADSU officers attended a regional training course in 2001.

## **Seychelles**

Seychelles is a very small narcotics player. Drug use is believed to be limited primarily to cannabis; other drugs are generally uncommon. Seychelles is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In December 2000, Seychelles signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.

## **Comoros**

Comoros is believed to have very limited narcotics activity. The penalties for drug possession and distribution are extremely severe and domestic production is starkly limited. The fragile nature of the government and recent political instability, however, make it difficult to assess accurately narcotics activity in Comoros.

## Morocco

### I. Summary

Despite the Government of Morocco's (GOM) law enforcement efforts, Morocco remains a major producer and exporter of cannabis. There continues to be no evidence Moroccan cannabis reaches the United States in significant amounts. An estimated 2,000 tons of hashish is produced each year, and 1,500 tons is believed to reach Europe annually, although estimates of the extent of cannabis cultivation in Morocco vary. The GOM's Royal Center for Remote Sensing estimates that Morocco's cannabis growing area covers a total of 15,000-20,000 hectares. These numbers are lower than those of the EU which estimates the area of cannabis cultivation to be 75,000-85,000 hectares. Morocco's estimates of production seem to be increasingly questionable in light of the GOM's acknowledgement that its cultivation estimates are surely low. The GOM's resource constraints continue to undermine its law enforcement efforts to counter drug trafficking. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in 1992 Morocco passed legislation designed to implement the Convention.

### II. Status of Country

Morocco consistently ranks among the world's largest producers and exporters of cannabis, and its cultivation and sale provide the economic base for much of northern Morocco. Only very small amounts of narcotics produced in or transiting through Morocco reach the United States. According to an EU-funded report, earnings from the illicit trade in hashish are approximately U.S. \$3 billion a year, and the hashish trade remains Morocco's primary source of hard currency. According to EU law enforcement officials, Moroccan cannabis is typically processed into hashish resin or oil and exported to Algeria, Tunisia, and Europe. To date, precursor chemicals are virtually nonexistent within the Moroccan drug market.

While cannabis is the traditional drug of choice for Moroccans, there is also a small but growing domestic market for harder drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Newspaper reports on Morocco's role as a major producer and exporter of drugs state there is a connection between local drug traffickers and international cartels such as Latin American cocaine rings. However, these allegations have never been clearly substantiated, although the fact that six tons of cocaine washed up unexpectedly on the Moroccan coast several years ago gives them added credibility. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

### III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** In response to recommendations made by the United Nations, the Moroccan Ministry of Health in the 1990s began to assess the drug situation in Morocco. Citing Morocco's obligations under the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Ministry encouraged the creation of the Agency for the Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Northern Provinces. In 1996, the GOM established a coordination unit for the fight against narcotics, Unite De Coordination De Lutte Anti-Drogue (UCLAD), in an effort to improve coordination between the various law enforcement services involved in the counternarcotics effort. UCLAD is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. UCLAD officials report they have been instrumental in reworking legislation to increase the maximum allowable prison sentence for drug offenses to 30 years as well as increase fines for narcotics violations to a range of U.S. \$20,000-\$80,000. Ten years imprisonment remains the typical sentence for major drug traffickers arrested in Morocco.

Coordination efforts among law enforcement agencies remain weak, and UCLAD has not yet been able to establish centralized control over all drug-related matters. European diplomats believe this is partly the result of the lack of resources to fulfill the UCLAD mandate.

**Accomplishments.** In March 2001, the GOM stated that the area used for cannabis cultivation had stabilized at about 65,000 hectares since 1994. This figure is substantially larger than the previous estimates by the GOM, which stated that the hectares devoted to cannabis hovered around 20,000 over the past years. Nevertheless, in March 2001, the GOM predicted to the UNDCP that hashish production in Morocco would be eliminated within seven years.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** As part of a 1992 counternarcotics initiative launched by the late King Hassan, an estimated 10,000 police were detailed to drug interdiction efforts in the north and Rif mountains in 1995. Since then, approximately every six months, the GOM has rotated personnel into this region and continued to maintain the same numbers of checkpoints. Moroccan forces also staff observation posts along the Mediterranean coast, and the navy carries out routine sea patrols and responds to sightings by the observation posts.

**Corruption.** The GOM does not promote drug production or trafficking as a matter of policy, and in the past it has disputed allegations that government officials in the northern territories are involved in the drug trade. However, in 1999 and 2000, there were several highly publicized arrests involving drug trafficking by Moroccan officials in the northern region. These efforts may be an indication the GOM is beginning to take a stronger stance against drug-related corruption. However, while a number of large drug-related arrests have been publicized, they appear to primarily involve foreigners. The media has not provided comparable publicity to Moroccan drug barons, who have a great deal of influence and power in the northern region.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Since 1993, a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty has been in force between Morocco and the United States. In 1989, Morocco and the U.S. signed a bilateral narcotics cooperation agreement which calls for cooperation in the fight against illicit production, trafficking, and abuse of narcotics. Morocco also has counternarcotics and/or mutual legal assistance treaties with the EU, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the UK. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in 1992, the GOM passed legislation designed to implement the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The GOM's announced programs would, if fully implemented, bring it substantially into compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. UCLAD continues to oversee cooperation between law enforcement services which have not traditionally been receptive to the exchange of information. However, UCLAD's centralized control of all drug-related matters is not yet completely realized. European diplomats believe this is partly the result of the lack of resources to fulfill the UCLAD mandate, and note that without increased funding, the aims of the 1988 UN Drug Convention will remain unattainable in Morocco. Morocco is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Morocco has signed but not ratified the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention.

**Cultivation/Production.** Small farmers cultivate most Moroccan cannabis in the northern or Rif region, although some is also grown in the Souss valley of the south. Those who cultivate cannabis have not been hurt by Morocco's two years of drought as it is a highly resistant crop. The average hectare of cannabis produces two to eight metric tons of raw plant. This implies that Morocco might produce in the range of 325,000 metric tons of raw cannabis (65,000 hectares x approximately .5 metric tons/hectare). The GOM has stated it is committed to the total eradication of cannabis production, but given the economic dependence on cannabis in Morocco's northern region, eradication is only feasible if accompanied by a highly subsidized crop substitution program.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** There are reports that Morocco is used as a transshipment point for hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine from Latin America entering Europe. However, with the exception of the six tons of cocaine which inadvertently washed up on the Moroccan coast in July 1997, there have been no substantial seizures of hard drugs in Morocco.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** The GOM does not acknowledge a significant hard drug addiction problem and does not actively promote reduction in domestic demand for cannabis. It has established a program to train the staffs of psychiatric hospitals in the treatment of drug addiction.

### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**U.S. Policy Initiatives.** U.S. policy goals in Morocco are designed to encourage GOM counternarcotics efforts; to cooperate with Moroccan law enforcement officials in curtailing production and transshipment of drugs; to provide training in law enforcement techniques; to promote the GOM's adherence to its obligations under relevant bilateral and international agreements; to provide support for existing Moroccan-European cooperation in this area; and to encourage greater international cooperation to control Moroccan production and export of drugs.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** Pursuant to the 1989 narcotics cooperation agreement, the United States and Morocco maintain occasional contact on counternarcotics issues. The United States has provided training and counternarcotics intelligence where applicable, and most recently conducted regional drug interdiction training in Morocco in December 1997.

**The Road Ahead.** The United States will continue to monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the GOM in its counternarcotics efforts, and, together with the EU, provide law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where possible.

# Mozambique

## I. Summary

Mozambique is increasingly a transit country for illegal drugs (hashish, herbal cannabis, cocaine, Mandrax (methaqualone), and heroin) consumed in Europe and South Africa. There are allegations that limited hashish shipments pass through Mozambique on their way to the United States and Canada. The country's porous borders, poorly policed seacoast, and inadequately trained and equipped law enforcement agencies make it susceptible to such transshipment. Production is largely limited to herbal cannabis. In 1995 and 2000 Mozambican and South African authorities jointly closed factories near Maputo producing Mandrax for export to South Africa. Information on drug use in Mozambique is limited. Available evidence suggests significant use of herbal cannabis and a rise in the consumption of "club drugs" (MDMA, ecstasy, etc.), stolen prescription medicines (methadone, rohypnol, diazepam, morphine), and heroin among urban elite.

While the Mozambican government recognizes increasing drug use and drug trafficking as a problem, competing demands for scarce funds prevent it from devoting significant resources to the issue. The government has not made these areas priorities for seeking donor funding. Ongoing cooperation programs with the UNDCP and bilateral donors are attempting to improve training of drug control officials and provide better interdiction and laboratory equipment. Corruption in the police and judiciary hampers counternarcotics efforts. Mozambique is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Mozambique is not a significant producer of illegal drugs. Herbal cannabis is produced throughout the country for local consumption and limited export to neighbors. Factories producing Mandrax for the South African market were raided and closed down in 1995 and 2000. There is growing concern about Mozambique's role as a drug-transit country. Experts agree that Southwest Asian producers ship hashish and cannabis resin through Mozambique to Europe and South Africa. Limited evidence suggests some of these shipments may also reach the United States and Canada, but not in quantities large enough to have a significant impact. The same producers use Mozambique to ship limited quantities of heroin to Europe and South Africa and Mandrax to South Africa. Reports from the Mozambican Office for the Prevention and Fight Against Drugs (GCPCD) indicated that heroin and other opiate derivatives shipped through Mozambique also originate in the "Golden Triangle" of Southeast Asia. A small Lusophone cocaine trafficking connection exists, in which limited amounts of cocaine from Colombia and Brazil transit Portugal and Angola or Mozambique on their way to South Africa. Mozambique is not a producer of precursor chemicals.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Mozambique's National Assembly passed counternarcotics legislation in March 1997 covering trafficking and consumption of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, precursors, and substances of similar effect. The 1997 legislation created the GPCD, the chief government planning and coordination body on drug control. Mozambique has no national program for the progressive elimination of its cannabis crop.

**Accomplishments.** Mozambique's accomplishments in meeting its goals under the 1988 UN Drug Convention remain somewhat limited. Government resources devoted to the counternarcotics effort are meager. Available donor funds are limited. Mozambique is cooperating with the UNDCP through two activities designed to increase law enforcement capacity and border control. Studies on drug trafficking, production, and use are insufficient to serve as the basis for developing a master plan.

Local law enforcement agents in some provinces have attempted to destroy cannabis crops. In 1995 and 2000, Mozambique cooperated with South Africa in raiding Mandrax factories near Maputo. Distribution of drugs in Mozambique is limited. Local rings distributing heroin and cocaine in Beira and Nampula have been targeted by police. Ring members have been arrested and drugs confiscated, but the organizations' operations are still believed to continue. In a March 2001 action, police in Maputo targeted hashish, heroin, and cocaine distribution networks, arresting 168 individuals and confiscating drugs. Provincial authorities in Cabo Delgado province launched a joint Ministry of Health/police operation in November 2001 to disrupt networks selling stolen/illegally imported prescription medicine. Police have also targeted a Mandrax distribution ring in the provincial capital of Xai Xai, arresting seven of 15 suspected members.

Mozambican officials seized assets connected with the production of Mandrax. Asset seizures related to profits derived from drug sales have not yet been made. Mozambique has not received requests for the extradition of drug-related suspects. Mozambique is a signatory to the 1997 Mutual Accord of Multilateral Assistance Regarding the Fight Against Crime in Southern Africa and has ratified the Southern African Development Community Protocol on the Combat of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa. The Mozambican government has undertaken drug education programs in local schools in cooperation with bilateral and multilateral donors as part of its demand reduction efforts. The efficacy of the programs has not yet been determined.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Founded in 1997, Mozambique's dedicated drug unit, which operates in Maputo and answers to the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Police, received refresher training in drug interdiction techniques as part of a UNDCP program in March 2001. Under the same program, 20 additional officers were hired and trained to staff dedicated drug units nationwide. An additional 50 staff are to be trained under the program. In addition, new drug detection equipment was installed at border posts, ports, and airports for these teams to use.

Mozambique's immigration service, a police unit within the Ministry of the Interior, is the lead agency at all ports of entry, but its role in narcotics enforcement is limited to passing its suspicions to police or customs officials. A UNDCP consultant report from August 2000 views immigration's role as "not crucial to the drugs law enforcement effort." No additional training has been provided.

Customs officers at Maputo's airport and seaport have received drug interdiction training under a UNDCP program. With support from an outside contractor, Maputo-based customs agents continue to develop an embryonic intelligence system that includes drug control information. The entire national customs service is currently being modernized under contract with the British firm Crown Agents, which has introduced drug interdiction methods. The UNDCP is working with customs agents at land borders as part of a tri-state program with Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland.

The largest seizure in 2000 occurred in August when a ship ran aground near Inhambane with cargo that included 15,000 kilograms of hashish in 1- and 2-kilogram blocks. In the most effective drug control operation of that year, Mozambican customs and police officials and their South African counterparts raided a Mandrax factory near Maputo.

Well publicized seizures in 2001 include:

- February raids of Maputo drug rings that yielded 99 packets of hashish, 320 grams of cocaine, and 30 pieces of heroin.
- February customs seizure at Maputo airport of seven boxes of 168 tablets each and nine boxes of 80 tablets each of ecstasy.
- March seizure of 45 kilograms of herbal cannabis in Quissico, Inhambane province.
- April raids of Maputo drug markets that yielded 200 grams of cocaine, 13 pieces of hashish, and 20 packets of heroin.
- April seizure of 35 packets of hashish in Maputo.

- May seizure of six tons of hashish in Inhambane.
- June seizure of 1.015 kilograms of cocaine, 8 kilograms of hashish, 44 bags of heroin, and 31 diazepam tablets in Beira.
- July seizure of 30 balls of hashish, 7 bundles of cannabis, 9 small doses of cocaine, and 2 doses of heroin (NB: Weights not available) in Maputo raids.
- July seizure of 600 kilograms of marijuana in the port of Nacala.

In addition, a joint Mozambican/South African police operation resulted in the April arrest of the owner of a Mandrax factory that authorities seized in 2000. Two others involved in the factory were sentenced in April to 20 years imprisonment. In November, nine Pakistanis were sentenced to 18 years in jail for trafficking in the 2000 Inhambane hashish case. Police in several provinces destroyed herbal cannabis crops in 2001.

According to a Council of Ministers' report to the National Assembly, 745 drug trafficking cases were opened in 2000, resulting in 256 individual convictions. Statistics for 2001 are unavailable.

**Corruption.** Corruption in all areas is pervasive in Mozambique. Legislation prohibits official corruption, including narcotics-related corruption, but it is not rigorously enforced. Mozambique has not prosecuted government officials for corruption relating to the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs or controlled substances. Nor has it prosecuted any individual for discouraging the investigation or prosecution of such acts. The former director of the Department of Investigative Operations of the Criminal Investigation Police, Paulo Wane, was detained in Maputo for alleged involvement in distributing hashish and heroin. No charges were filed, and he was released. The independent press and the Network of Mozambican NGOs Fighting Drugs (RNOMCD) have alleged that senior government and FRELIMO party officials are involved in drug trafficking or in covering up drug trafficking, but no hard evidence has yet emerged to support these accusations.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Mozambique has ratified the Southern African Development Community Protocol on the Combat of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa, and is a member of the 1997 Mutual Accord of Multilateral Assistance Regarding the Fight Against Crime in Southern Africa. Mozambique has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.

**Cultivation/Production.** Herbal cannabis is cultivated in Nampula, Zambezia, Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete, Manica, and Sofala provinces. There are indications of new cultivation in other provinces outside Maputo. The Mozambican government has no estimates on crop size. Intercropping is reportedly common.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** The picture of drugs transiting Mozambique is based upon limited seizure data and the opinions of local and UNDCP officials. Mozambique is not a primary transit country for drugs destined to the United States. Mozambique serves as a transit country for hashish, cannabis resin, heroin, and Mandrax originating in Southwest Asia. These drugs arrive in Mozambique by small ship via Dubai and are primarily destined for the South African market. Hashish and heroin are also shipped on to Europe, and there is evidence that some hashish may reach Canada and the United States. Airport, ports, and land borders with Swaziland and South Africa serve as disembarkation points for such shipments. The almost uninhabited Caribas Islands located near Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado serve as a base for traffickers.

Arrests in Brazil and Mozambique suggest that cocaine is being shipped by drug couriers from Colombia and Brazil to Mozambique and Angola through Lisbon for onward shipment to South Africa and East

Asia. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that Nigerian cocaine traffickers have targeted Mozambique as a gateway to the South African and European markets.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** No comprehensive study of Mozambique's drug abuse problem has been conducted. The primary drugs of abuse are alcohol and herbal cannabis. Heroin, cocaine, and "club drug" usage and prescription drug abuse is also reported among Mozambique's urban elite. Experts differ regarding the prevalence of Mandrax and hashish use. The GCPCD has developed a drug education program for use in schools. It has provided the material to a number of local NGOs, including the Academic League for Community Development (LADC) and RNOMCD, for use in their drug education programs. The Maputo GCPCD office launched an education program aimed at youth in April 2001. The program will include plays and lectures in schools, churches, and other places where youth gather. The Sofala provincial GCPCD office has created teams of community volunteers to organize educational programs in Beira, Dondo, Nhamatande, and Gorongosa. The GCPCD is finalizing a nationwide prevention project for donor funding. Drug abuse and treatment options are scarce. The GCPCD is seeking donor assistance in creating three regional treatment centers in Maputo, Beira, and Nampula.

#### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

The USG has included and will continue to include Mozambican law enforcement officials in regional training programs through the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) for Africa in Botswana. The USG has provided \$170,000 in support to the new Police Sciences Academy (ACIPOL) for curriculum development, and intends to provide a full-time advisor to help with the curriculum. The Department of Defense is providing training to the Mozambican navy to improve their coastal surveillance activities.

# Namibia

## I. Summary

Namibia is not a major drug producer or exporter; however, it continues to be used as a drug transit country. While the increase in drug seizures this past year may not be significant when compared to neighbors, the numbers reflect a noteworthy increase in the number of domestic arrests of users in a growing drug market. The most common illicit drugs are cannabis and methaqualone.

## II. Status of Country

Namibian police have not uncovered any laboratories producing narcotics in Namibia. They suspect that illicit drugs hidden in large trucks are smuggled into Namibia over land. While most of the narcotics are destined for the illicit South African market, more and more of the drugs are returning to or remaining in Namibia and feeding a growing domestic drug abuse problem. Police sources report significant increases in the use of cocaine, heroin, methaqualone, and LSD, and their first seizures of crack cocaine.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Namibia's Drug Law Enforcement Unit (DLEU) made a number of major arrests this year, although they lack the manpower and resources to adequately cover all areas of concern.

**Corruption.** Corruption plays a role in facilitating the movement of narcotics, but by regional standards, corruption in Namibia is low, and the government seeks to discipline officials who have been proven to be corrupt.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but it is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Namibia has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.

## IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. government has not provided any counternarcotics assistance programs to Namibia in the past except by providing training to Namibian law enforcement officials at the International Law Enforcement Academy, and by sending a very short-term Justice Department attorney to review municipal/community policing issues in the capital, Windhoek.

Namibian government officials have expressed interest in cooperating with international and U.S. law enforcement agencies. Namibia has been independent for only 11 years and needs training and resources to enhance its prosecution of international drug cases.

# Nigeria

## I. Summary

Nigeria remains a hub of narcotics trafficking and money laundering activity. Nigerian organized criminal groups dominate the African drug trade and transport narcotics to markets in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Some of these criminal organizations are engaged in advance-fee fraud, commonly referred to in Nigeria as “419 Fraud,” and other forms of defrauding U.S. citizens and businesses. Years of military rule and an associated economic decline contributed significantly to the expansion of drug trafficking and criminality in Nigeria. The resulting severe unemployment and widespread corruption provided both an incentive and a mechanism for Nigerian criminal groups to capitalize on Nigeria’s central location along the major drug routes and access to global narcotics markets. Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled via Nigeria accounts for a significant portion of the heroin imported into the United States. Nigerian criminal elements operating in South America transship cocaine through Nigeria on to Europe, Asia, and Africa. In Africa, Nigerian-trafficked cocaine is mainly bound for South Africa. Nigerian-grown marijuana is exported to neighboring West African countries and to Europe, but not in significant quantities to the United States. Aside from marijuana, Nigeria does not produce any of the drugs that its nationals traffic.

During 2001, President Obasanjo’s public denunciation of Nigerian criminal activity has been matched by a number of steps he has taken to tackle drug trafficking, money laundering, and other organized criminal activities. He is also seeking to improve the image of Nigeria abroad by more vigorous efforts against trafficking by Nigerian nationals. Funding of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)—Nigeria’s sole drug control agency—increased 200 percent, while the NDLEA’s dynamic leadership instituted a number of internal reforms that have improved the professionalism of the 3,500 men and women in the NDLEA.

Nigeria’s effort to strengthen its commitment to drug control and the fight against organized crime suffered a tragic setback when Chief Bola Ige, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, was assassinated on December 23, 2001. Chief Ige, Nigeria’s top law enforcement official and the official responsible for the NDLEA’s operations, was the catalyst behind many of the new counternarcotics and anticrime initiatives in the past year. President Obasanjo has pledged to find and prosecute those behind the assassination and to sustain the reforms started by the late Attorney General. A suspect was in police custody in early January 2002.

Nigeria instituted a campaign to root out corruption that started shortly after President Obasanjo’s inauguration in May 1999, and was sustained and strengthened in 2001. In late 2001, the Anti-Corruption Commission hired 93 investigators, prosecutors, and administrators, its first contingent of personnel not detailed from other agencies. The Obasanjo administration supports the domestically controversial 1990 NDLEA Act Number 33. This law dictates that Nigerians convicted of drug offenses abroad will be arrested upon their deportation back to Nigeria, and, if convicted, will be liable for a minimum of five years additional imprisonment for harming the reputation of Nigeria. But corruption embedded over 16 years of continuous military rule continues to be a problem for the Obasanjo administration, with the administration itself having suffered from a number of corruption scandals.

Over the years, Nigerian law enforcement agencies have had some limited success in combating the various elements of the drug trade. Typically, street pushers and trafficker “mules” are apprehended; the effort against large-scale traffickers has been less effective. In 2001, however, the Obasanjo government took a number of steps to strengthen the capacity of its enforcement agencies to deal with organized crime. Legislation was introduced into the National Assembly to improve the existing 1995 Money Laundering Act that had previously only criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking. Asset forfeiture has not been a successful deterrent against money laundering or drug trafficking activities. The

extent of corruption among enforcement officials and the judiciary raises serious questions about whether this particular sanction could be applied consistently enough to have a salutary effect, quite apart from the technical difficulty of putting together a particular case.

Interdiction and enforcement efforts are complicated by an absence of inter-agency cooperation and a serious lack of resources. Years of neglect by successive military regimes left the law enforcement community demoralized and ill-equipped to deal with sophisticated international criminal networks. This problem is compounded by pervasive corruption throughout all levels of government. There have been a few arrests of major traffickers; however, it can take years for a case to come to trial and no mechanism exists to track cases. Cases are often “systematically lost” within Nigeria’s judicial system.

## II. Status of Country

Nigeria produces no precursor chemicals or drugs that have a significant effect on the United States, but it remains a major drug-transit country. In addition, Nigerian criminal elements operate global trafficking/criminal networks.

The NDLEA is the law enforcement agency with sole responsibility for combating narcotics trafficking and drug abuse. It was established in 1989, and works alongside Nigerian Customs, the State Security Service, the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), the National Police, and the Nigerian Immigration Service at the various ports of entry. The NDLEA’s most successful interdictions have taken place at Nigeria’s international airports. The agency has successfully apprehended individual drug couriers transiting these airports and some of the drug traffickers sponsoring these couriers. An improved interdiction effort at the Lagos international airport during 2001 has forced smugglers to change tactics and ship contraband via Nigeria’s five major seaports or across its porous land borders.

In late 2001, the NDLEA carried out an unprecedented seizure of 60 kilograms of cocaine at the Lagos seaport of Tin Can Island. Following this seizure, the President issued an executive decree granting the NDLEA full operational access to all of Nigeria’s international seaports. This move, long called for by the U.S. government, is expected to greatly boost the NDLEA’s interdiction success.

As specialists in moving narcotics and other contraband, Nigerian criminal organizations are heavily involved in corollary criminal activities such as document fabrication, illegal immigration, and financial fraud. Their ties to criminals in the United States, Europe, South America, Asia, and South Africa are well documented. Nigerian poly-crime organizations exact significant financial and societal costs, especially among West African nations with limited resources for countering these organizations.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** In 2001, the democratically elected Obasanjo administration introduced a number of new legislative and executive initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking and organized crime. These initiatives included: the drafting of new money laundering legislation; drafting legislation to create an Anti-Terrorism, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission to coordinate government-wide efforts against money laundering and financial crimes; granting expanded authority to the NDLEA to operate in the five major international seaports of Nigeria; and forming an inter-agency anti-fraud committee to improve enforcement efforts against financial fraud. The draft bill to create an Anti-Terrorism, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission shows the government’s commitment to meeting its international obligations, particularly the criteria of the FATF. Nigeria’s counternarcotics policy is based on the National Drug Control Master Plan (NDCMP), which has been in place since 1998. This plan assigns responsibilities to various government ministries and agencies as well as NGOs and other interest groups. The master plan also outlines basic resource requirements and timeframes for the completion of objectives. Many of these goals have not yet been met.

Both chambers in the National Assembly have Narcotics Affairs Committees, which monitor the performance of the NDLEA and implementation of Nigeria's counternarcotics strategy. While frequent leadership changes at the NDLEA impaired the agency's interdiction activities in the past, the current NDLEA Chairman, Alhaji Bello Lafajaji, who assumed office in October 2000, has given the agency new life and much greater direction. Chairman Lafajaji has declared an all-out offensive against drug trafficking and has instituted a number of internal reforms to improve the professionalism of NDLEA staff, including the retiring of officials suspected of corruption and improving training and benefits for NDLEA personnel. Chairman Lafajaji also has called for harmonization of Nigeria's narcotics legislation and has sought increased international assistance for his agency. The NDLEA has also embarked upon a publicity campaign to combat narcotics trafficking and drug abuse by staging various contraband destruction events around the country.

**Accomplishments.** Nigeria's drug enforcement efforts improved substantially in 2001, particularly in the areas of interdiction and overall prosecution statistics. With assistance from the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the NDLEA launched a more aggressive drug interdiction campaign at the Lagos international airport, long known as a major gateway for U.S. and Europe-bound narcotics. This effort coincided with the resumption of direct (nonstop) flights from Lagos to the United States in February, after a hiatus of eight years. The report of only one seizure made by U.S. authorities at the port of entry of the flight (New York's John F. Kennedy Airport) is evidence of greatly improved screening by the NDLEA in Lagos.

The Nigerian government also improved its record of drug-related prosecutions. Using special drug courts, a more energetic effort by the NDLEA to prosecute drug traffickers efficiently and successfully produced over 2,000 convictions in 2001. In a notable November 2001 case, the NDLEA froze a bank account containing 1.6 million Naira (U.S. \$14,035), which belongs to a suspected drug trafficker and money launderer.

The Government of Nigeria also pledged to design a mechanism to process U.S. extradition requests expeditiously while observing due process under Nigerian law, in accordance with the Nigerian constitution. This mechanism will include the creation of an exclusive extradition team of public prosecutors and the designation of a High Court judge dedicated to extradition cases. In December 2001, the (late) Attorney General designated a High Court judge exclusively to hear extradition cases. While extradition requests were formerly heard in any court, including lower magistrates courts, the government has now centralized the handling of all U.S. extradition requests in the Federal High Court of Abuja.

At Nigeria's initiative, a high level U.S.-Nigeria law enforcement dialogue began in 2001. The first meeting of this semi-annual forum, the Bilateral Law Enforcement Committee, took place on November 9 in Washington, D.C. and covered the full range of U.S. and Nigerian law enforcement interests: drug control; financial fraud; trafficking in persons; corruption; immigration crimes; police reform; extradition; and money laundering. The dialogue has already led to commitments by Nigeria to take significant steps toward mutually agreed goals by March 2002.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Nigerian counternarcotics efforts primarily focus on the interdiction of couriers transiting Nigeria's air and seaports as well as a public campaign focused on destroying plots of cultivated marijuana throughout the country. Improved drug interdiction efforts at the Lagos airport and seaports led to a 40 percent increase in total drug seizures over 2000. Forty-three kilograms of heroin and 98 kilograms of cocaine were seized during 2001. Heroin seizures fell by almost 25 percent, while cocaine seizures almost doubled from a year earlier. This included a record seizure of 60 kilograms of cocaine at the Lagos seaport of Tin Can Island. The number of drug-related arrests increased to 3,592 from 2,385 in 2000, and 2,041 drug convictions were handed down during 2001, compared to 1,624 in 2000. Major narcotics smugglers and their networks continue to elude arrest and prosecution, even though the NDLEA recently began an intensified effort to investigate major international drug traffickers operating in Nigeria, in cooperation with the DEA. Attempts by the NDLEA to arrest and prosecute major traffickers and their associates often fail in Nigeria's weak judicial system, which is subject to intimidation and

corruption. Asset seizures from narcotics traffickers and money launderers, while permitted under Nigerian law, have never systematically been utilized as an enforcement tool, but some convicted traffickers have had their assets forfeited over the years. However, the number of traffickers so far penalized remains small.

**Corruption.** Corruption is a pervasive problem in Nigerian society. Estimated unemployment is over 25 percent. Civil servants' salaries are low. In addition, salaries are frequently months in arrears, compounding the corruption problem. After its inauguration, the Obasanjo administration embarked on a public anticorruption campaign. Legislation was enacted and an Anti-Corruption Commission was formed. This commission began prosecution of several minor officials on corruption charges, and initiated investigations into allegations of high-level corruption. The commission also has hired its first non-seconded staff of prosecutors, investigators, and administrators. The U.S. government is providing the commission with training and technical assistance for its new staff. Another commission was established to review government contracts awarded by past administrations.

The Obasanjo administration, unfortunately, has made limited progress toward transparency and openness in its contracting and decision making process. A number of criminal cases, launched by the Anti-Corruption Commission against public officials accused of bribe-taking, are moving forward and are expected to conclude early in 2002, although an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the commission's constitutionality has delayed these cases. Meanwhile, corruption remains a significant obstacle to counternarcotics efforts, especially in the judicial process. While the NDLEA has attempted to purge its ranks of officers suspected of corrupt practices, a fear of corruption hampers inter-agency cooperation as agencies are often distrustful and unwilling to share information.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Nigeria has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, which was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for pending U.S. extradition requests. In 1989, the United States and Nigeria entered into a mutual cooperation agreement for reducing demand, preventing illicit use, and combating illicit production and trafficking in drugs. The United States and Nigeria also signed in 1989 a mutual legal assistance treaty, which the United States ratified in 2001 and is pending approval by the Nigerian Parliament. Nigeria is a party to the World Customs Organization's Nairobi Convention, Annex on Assistance in Narcotics Cases.

**Cultivation/Production.** Cannabis is the only illicit drug produced in any large quantities in Nigeria. The drug is produced in all 36 states. Major cultivation takes place in central and northern Nigeria and in Delta and Ondo states in the south. Marijuana, or "Indian Hemp" as it is known locally, is sold in Nigeria and exported throughout West Africa and into Europe. To date, there is no evidence of significant marijuana imports from Nigeria into the United States. The NDLEA has been engaged in an active eradication campaign. Through November 2001, the NDLEA claimed to have seized more than 290 metric tons of cannabis and eradicated more than 270 hectares of cannabis plants in the field. In August 2001, the NDLEA invited dignitaries and the diplomatic corps to a narcotics destruction ceremony in Lagos to highlight the agency's seizures of narcotics throughout the country.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Nigeria is a major staging point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled to Europe and the United States and for South American cocaine transported to Europe. While Nigeria remains Africa's drug transit hub, there are indications that the preferred methods of transshipment have changed. Improvement of the overall security posture at Murtala Mohammed International Airport has forced drug traffickers to ship by sea from Nigerian seaports, concealing large quantities of contraband in shipping containers. They also use other West African airports with more lax security controls.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** Local production and use of marijuana have been a problem in Nigeria for some time, however, according to the NDLEA and NGOs, the abuse of harder drugs (e.g., cocaine, heroin) is now on the rise. Heroin and cocaine are readily available in many of Nigeria's larger cities. Law enforcement officials admit that Nigeria remains a major narcotics transshipment point, but some officials deny that domestic drug abuse is on the rise. U.S. officials and training instructors find that many Nigerian officials do not understand that by serving as a transit point, Nigeria may itself begin to suffer significant drug abuse problems, like many other similar transit points worldwide. The NDLEA continues to expand its counternarcotics clubs at Nigerian universities and distribute counternarcotics literature. The NDLEA also has instituted a teacher's manual for primary and secondary schools, which offers guidance on teaching students about drug abuse.

#### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**Policy Initiatives.** U.S.-Nigerian counternarcotics cooperation focuses on interdiction efforts at major international entry points and on professionalizing the NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies. U.S. training and material assistance have continued, with the NDLEA as the primary target. The U.S. DEA office deals with a small group of NDLEA representatives to lessen the chance of compromise by corrupt individuals. USG working-level representatives enjoy good access to their counterparts and there is an evident desire on both sides to strengthen these relationships. The new NDLEA chairman appears committed to meeting agency goals and improving the morale of NDLEA officers. The United States and Nigeria held bilateral discussions during 2001 on the need to reform Nigeria's police as part of the preparations to implement a U.S.-funded police reform program in 2002. The Nigerian government has reviewed plans for reform and U.S. agencies have prepared their own suggestions for ways to proceed, but the task will be formidable as the police lack so much in the way of equipment, and their morale has suffered over the years as the situation deteriorated. For example, salaries are low and frequently paid months late.

**Bilateral Accomplishments.** In 2001, at the request of the GON, a U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Law Enforcement Committee was created to advance mutual drug and crime control issues. Co-chaired by Nigeria's Attorney General and the State Department's Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the group met for the first time in November 2001 in Washington. This meeting produced a joint declaration containing Government of Nigeria pledges to: introduce new money laundering legislation; begin investigation of at least one major drug trafficker in cooperation with DEA; draft and introduce to the National Assembly new legislation allowing for the civil forfeiture of assets derived from organized crime or drug-trafficking; commence extradition proceedings of individuals wanted for prosecution by the U.S. government; and boost resources for the new Anti-Corruption Commission. Meanwhile, the DEA office in Nigeria continues to work with the NDLEA on expanding their relationship. New Department of State assistance to the NDLEA allowed for a stronger interdiction posture at the Lagos international airport, Nigeria's largest drug transit point, forcing many traffickers to route drug shipments through neighboring countries. Department of State assistance has also been provided to the Nigerian Police Force to improve investigations and enforcement operations against criminal organizations involved in advance fee or 419 Fraud, which largely targets American citizens and businesses. The United States also provided training for NDLEA personnel on general investigative techniques and sent two NDLEA officers responsible for drug interdiction at the Lagos international airport to a specialized training course in the United States.

**The Road Ahead.** The U.S.-Nigerian relationship has improved significantly with the reintroduction of democratic government in Nigeria. During the past year President Obasanjo demonstrated his commitment to the international drug fight by increasing the NDLEA's budget by 200 percent and giving this agency long-awaited operational access to Nigeria's sea ports. Nevertheless, much remains to be done in the area of drug control; and the Nigerian government needs to address key weaknesses, including the processing of U.S. extradition requests and the local prosecution of major drug traffickers. As noted elsewhere in this report, the narcotics and crime problems in Nigeria are deeply rooted in Nigeria's present

governmental system, and in Nigerian society. It will require strong political will and continued international assistance for any Nigerian government to confront these difficult issues and bring about meaningful change.

The U.S. government is working to aid Nigeria in its counternarcotics efforts. One area of prime concern is the judiciary. Law enforcement efforts are often stymied by the slow pace of the judicial system, which can be attributed to both intimidation and corruption of the judiciary by criminal organizations. The U.S. Agency for International Development has implemented a “Rule of Law” program with the Nigerian government to help strengthen and professionalize the judiciary. Through the framework of the new Bilateral Law Enforcement Committee, the Nigerian government has committed itself to the establishment of a reliable extradition process that will allow extradition requests to be heard expeditiously and fairly. Many U.S. extradition requests for narcotics traffickers have been outstanding for years.

The U.S. government is also concerned about fundamental problems with the Nigerian Police Force and other law enforcement agencies. While President Obasanjo and his advisors are aware of the need to modernize the police as a key pillar of democratic consolidation, little has been done to address key issues such as low salaries for police and other law enforcement personnel. Salary arrears also remain a problem. The Government of Nigeria needs to demonstrate a commitment of its own resources to the fight against narcotics trafficking and transnational crime in order to strengthen its case for additional foreign donor assistance.

The U.S. government will continue to actively engage Nigeria on the issues of counternarcotics and money laundering. There have been successes in the last year, but long-term progress will only come about through the continuation of serious dialogue and cooperation, and a willingness on the part of Nigeria’s government to confront difficult issues. The underlying institutional and societal factors that contribute to narcotics-trafficking and money-laundering activities in Nigeria are deep-seated and require comprehensive, long-term solutions.

# Saudi Arabia

## I. Summary

Saudi Arabia has no appreciable drug production and is not a significant transit country for drug traffickers. Saudi Arabia's conservative cultural and religious norms discourage drug abuse. The Saudi government places a high priority on combating narcotics abuse and trafficking. Since 1988, the government has imposed the death penalty for drug smuggling. Due to these factors, drug abuse and trafficking do not pose major social or law enforcement problems. However, Saudi officials privately acknowledge that illegal drug use is on the rise. Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Saudi Arabia has no significant drug production and, in keeping with its conservative Islamic values and obligations under the 1988 UN Drug Convention, places a high priority on fighting narcotics abuse and trafficking. Narcotics-related crimes are punished harshly, and narcotics trafficking is a capital offense, with the death penalty enforced against Saudis and foreigners alike. As of December 1, 21 convicted traffickers had been executed in 2001. Saudi Arabia relies on a network of overseas drug enforcement liaison offices and on state-of-the-art detection and training programs to combat drug trafficking.

While Saudi officials are determined in their counternarcotics efforts, drug trafficking and abuse is a growing problem, albeit a minor problem compared to many western nations. Since the Saudi government provides no statistics on drug consumption, interdiction, and trafficking, it is difficult to substantiate this assessment with hard data. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia's relatively affluent population, large numbers of unemployed youth, and high profit margins on smuggled narcotics make the country an attractive target for drug traffickers and dealers.

The Saudi government undertakes widespread counternarcotics educational campaigns in the media, health institutes, and schools. Government efforts to treat drug abuse are aimed solely at Saudi nationals, who are referred to one of the nation's four drug treatment centers. There are no separate facilities for Saudi women, and expatriate substance abusers are jailed and summarily deported. Health officials confirm anecdotal reports of a general increase in substance abuse, but note that most addictions are not severe due to the scarcity of available narcotics and their diluted form. Heroin and hashish are the most heavily consumed substances, but Saudi officials report that cocaine and amphetamines are also in demand. Paint/glue inhalation and abuse of prescription drugs is also reported.

## III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** The lead agency in Saudi Arabia's drug interdiction efforts is the Ministry of Interior, which has over 20 overseas offices in countries identified as representing a trafficking threat. In addition, the Saudi government continues to play a leading role in efforts to enhance intelligence sharing among the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia is a donor to the UNDCP and its drug enforcement personnel regularly participate in international training programs.

**Accomplishments/Law Enforcement Efforts.** In June 2001 and at the USG's request, the Saudi government deported a U.S. citizen to the U.S. to face narcotics-related charges. This extradition was an unprecedented step forward in U.S.-Saudi counternarcotics cooperation. Drug seizures, arrests, prosecutions, and consumption trends are not matters of public record, although reports of drug seizures by Saudi officials appear occasionally in local newspapers. Saudi interdiction efforts tend to focus more on individual carriers than on follow-on operations designed to identify drug distributors and regional networks. After training by U.S. Customs Service advisors, Saudi customs agents employ advanced

detection techniques which have yielded an increase in drug seizures, predominantly heroin, hashish, and pills, at some points of entry.

**Corruption.** The USG has no evidence of involvement by Saudi government officials in the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances.

**Agreements and Treaties.** There are no extradition or mutual legal assistance agreements between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, although Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Saudi Arabia is also a party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

**Cultivation/Production.** Cultivation and production of narcotics in Saudi Arabia is negligible.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Saudi Arabia is not a major drug transshipment point. Due in part to new detection techniques employed at major points of entry, seizures of narcotics, coming primarily from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Turkey have increased.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** In addition to widespread media campaigns against substance abuse, the Saudi government sponsors drug education programs directed at school-age children, health care providers, and mothers. Executions of convicted traffickers—public beheadings which are widely publicized—are believed by Saudi officials to serve as a deterrent to narcotics trafficking and abuse. The country's influential religious establishment actively preaches against narcotics use and government treatment facilities provide free counseling to male Saudi addicts.

#### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

The U.S. seeks to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Saudi government. Saudi officials actively seek and participate in U.S.-sponsored training programs and are receptive to enhanced official contacts with DEA.

**The Road Ahead.** The U.S. will continue to arrange regular visits of DEA officers to Saudi Arabia. It will also explore opportunities for additional bilateral training and cooperation.

# Senegal

## I. Summary

Senegal saw a decrease in the trafficking of cocaine and heroin in 2001 while marijuana production and trafficking continues to be a problem for the counternarcotics elements of the government. Senegal funded and began to implement the 1997 National Plan of Action Against Drug Abuse and Trafficking in Drugs in 2001. Senegalese counternarcotics authorities have taken active steps to pursue bilateral cooperation against international traffickers, including signing assistance agreements with the U.S., France, and the UK. Education and strict enforcement of drug laws remain the cornerstone of Senegal's counternarcotics effort. Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

While trafficking of all types of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, and psychotropic depressants, exists in Senegal, it is cannabis production and trafficking that has continued to stymie enforcement efforts. The areas in southern Senegal's Casamance region are the source of the cannabis trade. The area is home to a small, but violent rebel insurgency that has prevented efforts to stop the marijuana trade. Cannabis transit is becoming increasingly significant especially by sea container transport from the 16 islands that make up the Casamance. This area is for all practical enforcement purposes beyond government control. Marijuana produced in the Casamance finds its way into Dakar, the capital city. For example, more than a ton of marijuana was seized in Dakar during the first six months of 2001. Stiff penalties for offenders have been effective in reducing the quantity of heroin, cocaine, and psychotropic substances on the streets of Dakar.

The port of Dakar and the international airport of Dakar are the two principal points of entry/exit of drugs in Senegal. Senegalese authorities state that because there is not a direct flight from South America, Cape Verde serves as a bridge for cocaine coming into Senegal.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Senegal began implementation of the 1997 National Plan of Action Against Drug Abuse and the Trafficking of Drugs. This plan is multidisciplinary in its approach, having among its objectives:

- to control the cultivation, production, and traffic of drugs;
- to inform the population of the dangers of drug use; and
- to develop a program to rehabilitate and re-introduce drug addicts to society.

Also in 1997 an inter-ministerial committee to fight against drugs was established. The purpose of this committee is to elaborate and coordinate the national political fight against drugs. In the year 2000 the committee implemented a demand reduction program in the Casamance region delivered by a non-governmental organization. The first phase involved an information campaign, insisting that the land had greater potential if it were used for other purposes than drugs, that drugs were bad for the environment and one's health, and that drugs were degrading the economy. Village committees have been established to pass on the above information in an effort to sensitize people to the problem of drugs. The second phase of the program began in 2001, with the village committees suggesting that farmers substitute alternative crops for drugs on their land. These programs, due to funding constraints, have been slow to be implemented and the goals have yet to be realized. Only occasional seizures and arrests of international traffickers have resulted.

Traffickers and their organizations are subject to asset seizures, imprisonment, and permanent exclusion from Senegal if convicted.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. Senegal has several bilateral agreements with neighboring countries to combat narcotics trafficking and has signed mutual assistance agreements with the United Kingdom and France in efforts to combat narcotics trafficking. Senegal is also a party to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol agreement, which includes an extradition provision. Senegal signed in December 2000 the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.

**Corruption.** By regional standards, corruption in Senegal is relatively modest. Nevertheless, it could facilitate narcotics trafficking. The authorities are aware of the problem, and do what they can to ameliorate the affects of corruption on important aspects of administration such as the battle against dangerous drugs.

Neither the Government of Senegal nor senior officials of the Government encourage or facilitate production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

#### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

U.S. goals in Senegal are to strengthen law enforcement capabilities in counternarcotics efforts. To this end, the U.S. and Senegal signed in 2001 a letter of agreement, under which the U.S. is providing assistance to build a regional drug laboratory in Dakar and train counternarcotics agents in drug investigation and interdiction methods. The program will provide \$220,000 for various law enforcement programs that will aid the police in all aspects of narcotics investigations and prosecutions. The laboratory and training facilities are scheduled to begin operations in early 2002.

# South Africa

## I. Summary

South Africa is committed to fighting domestic and international trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs, but reliable evidence suggests that the country continues to be an important transit area for cocaine from South America and heroin from the Far East. The cocaine and heroin that transits South Africa is destined primarily for domestic Southern African or European markets. In addition to being a large producer of cannabis, most of which is consumed in the Southern African region, South Africa may be the world's largest consumer of Mandrax. Mandrax, a variant of methaqualone, is the drug of abuse of choice in South Africa, and its smuggling, primarily from India but also from China and other sources, is the single most important money-earner for indigenous South African organized crime groups. In 1997, a study conducted by the South African Police Service found 192 indigenous organized criminal gangs active in all of South Africa. Ninety-two of these gangs were primarily focused on the international smuggling of narcotics, with Mandrax the leading drug.

South Africa is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In 2001, South Africa and the United States exchanged instruments of ratification to bring into force an extradition treaty and a mutual legal assistance treaty. South Africa's Prevention of Organized Crime Act, particularly the asset forfeiture section, is becoming a useful tool for law enforcement.

## II. Status of Country

South Africa's transition to democracy and its integration into the world economy have been accompanied by the increased use of its territory for the transshipment of contraband of all types, including narcotics. Outdated regulatory and legislative infrastructures and a criminal justice system that is stretched just to deal with common "street crime" make South Africa a tempting target for international organized crime groups of all types. With assistance from the United States and other donors, South Africa is making slow progress in crafting an appropriate response to this situation.

South Africa has, for some time, been the origin, transit point, or terminus of many major smuggling routes; this was true during the apartheid period, and it is even more so now. Additionally, South Africa has the most developed transportation, communications, and banking infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. The country's modern international telecommunications systems, particularly wireless telephones, its direct air links with South America and Europe, and its permeable land borders provide opportunities for regional and international trafficking in all forms of contraband, including narcotics. Narcotics trafficking is very profitable for organized crime syndicates, and they have become heavily involved in stealing vehicles and trading them across South Africa's land borders for narcotics.

South Africa continues to rank among the world's largest producers of cannabis. The drug is consumed locally and exported to other countries, but there is no evidence that cannabis produced in South Africa has a significant effect on the United States. Smuggling of cannabis to Europe continues to increase.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Combating the use of and the trafficking in illicit narcotics is an important component of the anticrime agenda of the Government of South Africa (SAG). South African Police Service (SAPS) Commissioner Selebi has said publicly that fighting drugs is one of his top priorities. The SAPS organized crime threat analysis has identified the trafficking and use of drugs as the top organized crime threat. Recent studies have shown that drugs serve as the catalyst in a considerable proportion of violent crimes. On average, the studies found that 45.6 percent of arrestees in South Africa test positive for at least one

drug. The average was higher in connection with violent crime. South Africa has one of the world's highest murder and rape rates.

South Africa's porous borders are crossed daily by criminals trafficking in many forms of contraband, including, but certainly not limited to illicit narcotics, stolen cars, illegal firearms, diamonds, and precious metals. In 2001, the SAPS reorganized themselves, collapsing most of their 502 specialized units into organized crime task forces that deal with various types of crimes, including narcotics smuggling. The SAPS Narcotics Bureau (SANAB), for now, remains a specialized unit. However, the SAPS plans to integrate the narcotics specialists into the organized crime task forces. It is too early to tell whether or not the reorganization of the SAPS has had any impact on organized crime.

The Central Drug Authority (CDA), comprising government officials, NGOs, researchers, and officials from the drug treatment community, began to meet regularly in 2001. The group is tasked primarily with implementing the National Drug Master Plan, coordinating counternarcotics programs, acting as an authoritative advisor to the government, and initiating measures to combat the abuse of drugs, among others. The CDA is also beginning to work with the SAPS on school-based drug education programs.

**Accomplishments.** The National Directorate for Public Prosecutions (NDPP) in 2001 advanced its understanding of the new 1998 Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA), which outlawed certain criminal conspiracies and put teeth into previous legislation outlawing money laundering. The NDPP put a few test cases through the judicial system. The NDPP also established, with U.S. assistance, an approval process for the cases being prosecuted under the POCA. The NDPP anticipates that the law will be used more extensively in 2002, to include some narcotics trafficking cases.

The National Assembly's Justice Committee is currently deliberating on the Interception and Monitoring Bill, which will regulate the monitoring of communications by the government and private citizens. The new legislation covers cell phones and the Internet in addition to older technologies and will replace the current law. The SAG believes that having the ability to trace all cell phone conversations will be a vital weapon in the fight against organized crime. The Justice Committee hopes to complete deliberations on the bill early in 2002.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** SANAB and the South African Customs Service continue to make seizures of cocaine and increasingly, heroin, arriving in South Africa at international airports as well as to a lesser extent at border crossings. In July, the SAPS, in coordination with the shipping industry, intercepted a vessel en route from Argentina to China and seized 116 kilograms of cocaine worth approximately U.S. \$25 million. In addition, in August, the SAPS seized 155 kilograms worth of cocaine on a vessel en route from Brazil to China. This cocaine had an estimated street value of U.S. \$32.5 million. The aerial wing of the police carries out an airborne cannabis eradication program domestically and also offers limited cannabis eradication to regional states. However, due to a lack of operational funding, these operations have become much reduced.

Increased training of South African police by the DEA have led to more seizures of drugs destined for export this year, especially in the Durban area. Durban has also benefited from the formation of a special drug unit at its port, targeted on containers.

The Revenue Service reorganized the South African Customs Service last year to make it more effective in interdicting and investigating smuggling of all types, including narcotics trafficking. Improvements in its performance are already clear, and further improvements are anticipated as the new organizational arrangements become more familiar. South African Customs continues to be active in investigating the use of the postal system for international criminal activities.

A discussion on drug control in South Africa is incomplete without consideration of South Africa's broader law enforcement issues. While law enforcement in South Africa is frequently excellent by any standards, the internal problems in law enforcement that exist in most agencies impede both anticrime and counternarcotics efforts. In addition to equipment and coordination issues, which reduce the effectiveness of enforcement efforts in many countries, South Africa also has the unique problem that a short while

ago, the role of its national police was to enforce apartheid. The continuing legacy of this fact poses a special challenge to law enforcement in South Africa. Lingering racism and inappropriate use of violence, especially by white officers against black suspects, and a view among whites that black criminal violence against them is underplayed in black-majority South Africa limits police-civilian cooperation against crime. In addition, South Africa's counternarcotics efforts are further complicated by its reliance on less effective neighbors to interdict contraband headed its way. Zambia, Mozambique, and Swaziland provided the most popular transit routes for the smuggling of Mandrax into South Africa.

**Corruption.** Officials accused of corruption can be prosecuted under the 1992 Corruption Act. Accusations of widespread police corruption are frequent, but the experience of U.S. law enforcement officials working from the U.S. Embassy in South Africa is that many of the failures and lapses by the police can be attributed as much to a lack of training and resources as to corruption. Credible evidence of narcotics-related corruption among senior South African law enforcement officials has not been brought to light. Nevertheless, some low-level corruption and much mal/misfeasance among border control officials do appear to contribute to the permeability of South Africa's borders.

**Agreements and Treaties.** South Africa is a party to the 1996 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking. South Africa is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. In September 1999, the United States and South Africa signed a mutual legal assistance treaty and a new extradition treaty to replace the existing 1947 extradition treaty. Instruments of ratification were exchanged in 2001 to bring the bilateral treaties into force. In December 2000, South Africa signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. In September 2001, the United States and South Africa also signed a letter of agreement on anticrime and counternarcotics assistance, which provides for U.S. training and commodity assistance to several South African law enforcement agencies.

**Cultivation/Production.** South Africa is one of the world's leading producers of marijuana. Locally called "dagga," it grows wild and is a traditional crop used in many rural areas of South Africa, particularly the Eastern Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces. It also is cultivated in neighboring Swaziland and Lesotho. It is possible to have three cannabis crops a year in some areas of Southern Africa. Although most of South African-produced cannabis is consumed domestically, the country is fast becoming known as an exporter of the drug. The drug liaison officer, stationed at the UK Embassy in Pretoria, working with South African enforcement officials, has made numerous controlled deliveries of ten to 30 kilograms in the past two years. Other similar seizures have been reported as far away as Japan and Australia. Some sense of the scale of marijuana traffic in Southern Africa can be garnered from this year's seizure figures in excess of 717 metric tons.

South Africans are the world's largest consumers of Mandrax. Mandrax is both smuggled into and produced in South Africa for domestic consumption. SANAB seized five operating Mandrax laboratories in South Africa in 2000, and has seized six more since then. These laboratories obtain some chemicals from Europe, but the most essential precursors come from India and Pakistan. Mandrax trafficking has traditionally been, and continues to be, controlled by the Indian ethnic community. In South Africa, Mandrax is often smoked in a homemade bottle-pipe with low-grade cannabis, a practice called "smoking the White Pipe." Research has shown that South Africa is the only place in the world where this odd abuse usage is prevalent.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Cocaine, in significant amounts, reaches South Africa from South America, although smuggling groups in neighboring countries are also targeting South Africa as their market. Cocaine continues to be controlled in South Africa by Nigerian trafficking groups based in Johannesburg. According to the DEA, it appears as if these groups have permanently stationed operatives in Quito, Lima, and Sao Paulo, who control the couriers when they arrive from South Africa. Nigerian drug trafficking organizations are recruiting South Africans, and also using Nigerian couriers with fake or

fraudulently obtained passports. Lately the passport of choice seems to be from the UK. Most of the cocaine trafficked into South Africa is done through body carrying or in luggage. The Nigerian groups maintain tight control of the distribution of cocaine right down to the street level. South African consumption of cocaine, both powder and crack (crystalline), is increasing dramatically according to studies conducted in South African treatment centers. This increase in the use of crack has occurred even though its street price puts it out of reach for much of the population.

Mandrax traffic in South Africa is closely entwined with auto theft rings. Many cars stolen in South Africa are taken to Zambia where they are exchanged for Mandrax which is then smuggled back to South Africa. The port of entry of choice for Mandrax continues to be Mombasa, Kenya, with Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Maputo, Mozambique following closely behind. However, in 2000, the DEA and the SAPS initiated an investigation into a Johannesburg-based Indian organization, which smuggled more than six tons of Mandrax into the country in one consignment.

Heroin is smuggled into South Africa from Southwest and Southeast Asia using many of the same routes used for Mandrax. Much of the heroin is destined for onward shipment to Europe and, possibly, some small amount to the United States. However, heroin consumption among South African youth and some young people in other countries has also increased, particularly with the advent of smokable heroin. According to the DEA and local NGOs monitoring epidemiological data in South Africa, South Africa has experienced a 40 percent increase in intravenous heroin users over the last three years, raising further concerns about the increased spread of HIV/AIDS.

Groups trafficking in MDMA (ecstasy) include “biker” gangs and loosely confederated opportunists providing the drug for “rave” parties and distribution among youth. The drugs are usually carried by couriers via commercial air from Europe or sent via parcel post.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** South Africa has had a long history of Mandrax and cannabis abuse. Drug counselors have noted increases in the number of patients seeking treatment for crack, heroin, and “club-drug” (such as ecstasy) addictions in the past two to five years. However, heroin use is probably the fastest growing drug abuse problem in South Africa. In addition, data has shown a marked increase in the demand for treatment by persons younger than 20 years old, with some centers reporting usage by children as young as seven or eight. General budgetary constraints have meant that SAG subsidies for non-government drug rehabilitation agencies have been drastically cut in the last two to three years. There are many people seeking treatment who are unable to register with any program, and for those who manage to enter a rehabilitation program, available services are constrained by lack of resources.

## IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

**Policy Initiatives.** Crime is an important issue in South Africa. While much criminal activity is restricted in its impact to South Africa, an important share of all crime has an impact on the region and on the rest of the world. U.S. law enforcement officers from the DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service, INS, and Secret Service cooperate successfully with their South African counterparts on most occasions. The United States also regularly urges the SAG to propose legislation that will strengthen South Africa’s legal system and provide a legal framework for prosecuting more sophisticated organized criminal activities, including drug trafficking. In support of these objectives, the United States helped train a new, elite South African enforcement force called the “Scorpions.” This unit targets organized crime and high-profile crime of all sorts. The U.S. law enforcement agencies, funded by the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, also provide significant training to the SAPS and the SARS (Revenue Service Enforcement).

The United States is encouraging South Africa to initiate a drug education program in South Africa patterned after the Partnership for a Drug Free America. The United States is working on this project in connection with the Central Drug Authority and several SAG ministries.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** In 2001, the United States provided a complex fraud investigative computer programming tool to the organized crime units of the SAPS in an attempt to facilitate increased sharing of information among investigators in different parts of the country. The U.S. law enforcement community also provided extensive training to the Scorpions, SAPS, and SARS in 2001 on issues including investigating sexual offences, interviewing and interrogation techniques, gang violence, drug detection and monitoring, major case management, and complex fraud cases.

The United States' long-term anticrime and counternarcotics strategy includes a program of continued assistance to and cooperation with South African law enforcement and criminal justice authorities.

**The Road Ahead.** The commitment to create an effective legal and regulatory infrastructure to combat drug trafficking, and all other forms of organized crime, exists both in the SAG and in the SAG parliament. However, the process of implementing change is likely to be slow and uneven in the near future.

# Swaziland

## I. Summary

Drug activities in Swaziland primarily center on the production, packaging, and shipment of marijuana. The cash crop is consumed locally and also exported to South Africa. To some extent, marijuana is also exported to Europe and the U.S., but in modest quantities unlikely to have a significant effect. Swaziland's proximity to South Africa, its lack of effective counternarcotics legislation, limited enforcement resources, and relatively developed economic infrastructure make it enticing to those interested in targeting the relatively rich South African market. The Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland is aware of the drug problem within its borders and is cooperating with neighboring countries to fight drug trafficking. Swaziland is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Concern over illicit drug production and trafficking is growing. Bulk shipments of narcotics from South Africa are sent to Swaziland, where they are cut for retail distribution to South Africa, Europe, and to a lesser extent, the U.S.

The Royal Swaziland Police has an counternarcotics unit with a staff of 20. U.S. assistance has helped the counternarcotics unit to interdict illicit drug shipments, arrest traffickers, and eradicate cannabis; however, the unit's effectiveness is hampered by a lack of resources, outdated laws, and to a certain extent, corruption among related entities. The unit lacks adequate detection equipment, narcotics dogs, and office automation equipment. The unit's level of training continues to increase with the assistance of the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Botswana, which offers workshops on a variety of topics, including weapons use and narcotics interdiction. At times, the unit is called upon to perform routine police work unrelated to narcotics, which detracts from its focus.

## III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Swaziland's narcotics law dates from the 1920s; however, the country is currently in the process of updating its counternarcotics law. During 2001, a U.S. Department of Justice consultant assisted the Attorney General's office in drafting new counternarcotics legislation. The resulting draft legislation is currently being reviewed by Southern African Development Community's (SADC) legal staff to assure compliance with the SADC protocol. In August 2001, King Mswati III gave his assent to the Serious Offences Act of 2001, which provides for the confiscation of proceeds of many serious offences, one of which is narcotics trafficking.

**Accomplishments.** Despite the lack of resources, the counternarcotics unit in 2001 made several highly publicized raids, seizures, and arrests including the arrests of a few local athletes alleged to be abusing illicit drugs. In early 2001, the Royal Swaziland Police seized compressed cannabis, cocaine, and heroin. The Royal Swaziland Police believe the drugs were destined for the U.S., the UK, and the Netherlands.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Swaziland is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the SADC protocol on combating illicit drug trafficking. It is also a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. Swaziland has entered into agreements on narcotics control with Mozambique and South Africa, and with the UNDCP on a common project: "Capacity building against drug trafficking and organized crime in Southern Africa." The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty applies to Swaziland. Swaziland has an extradition treaty with South Africa, as well as a protocol and mutual understanding on narcotics with Commonwealth Countries. Swaziland signed the UN Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime in December 2000, and signed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants on January 8, 2001.

**Corruption.** Corruption exists to a certain extent among police, customs, and other government officials. During 2001, there were allegations that a member of the Correctional Services was smuggling marijuana to one prisoner and, in another case, the files of a suspected marijuana dealer on trial mysteriously disappeared. In general, expatriate police officials have characterized corruption as “mild,” and it is thought that the corruption affects interdiction, arrests, and convictions.

Neither the Government of Swaziland nor senior officials of the Government encourage or facilitate production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

**Cultivation/Production.** The primary illicit drug crop in Swaziland is marijuana, most of which is grown in the northern part of the country. According to marijuana eradication experts in South Africa, each hectare of marijuana can yield approximately 2,000 kilograms (2 metric tons) of dried marijuana. It is estimated that there are roughly 790 hectares currently growing in Swaziland, resulting in a possible yield of roughly 1.6 million kilograms (1,600 metric tons) of dried marijuana.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** In 2001, the Royal Swaziland Police conducted a number of high profile raids, arrests, eradication campaigns, and drug burnings. For example, in late September, police raided a home in an exclusive Mbabane residential area and found 99 boxes of marijuana valued at nearly \$111,000. On July 25, the police destroyed 499 bags of marijuana, 357 compressed blocks of marijuana, and quantities of cocaine and heroin in a public ceremony. The value of these drugs totaled roughly \$133,000. In mid-June, police arrested and charged 16 people for illegal possession of over 200 kilograms of marijuana in separate incidents. Furthermore, nearly 120 police conducted a raid in the village of Nyonyane and, in the process, burned nearly \$1,110,000 of marijuana that was being cultivated in a nearby farm.

Cooperation with South Africa is excellent. In late March, the South African High Commissioner to Swaziland presented 12 backpack sprayers to the police to assist the counternarcotics unit in eradicating cannabis. Each year, the Government of Swaziland spends roughly \$11,000 to hire a helicopter from South Africa to help destroy marijuana in Swaziland. Both Swaziland and South Africa support UK-provided training and U.S. assistance.

#### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

In 2001 the U.S. donated two 4x4 trucks to assist the unit in its counternarcotics activities in rural areas. During 2001, a U.S. Department of Justice consultant assisted the Attorney General’s office in drafting new counternarcotics legislation.

The USG supports Swazi efforts to eradicate cannabis crops. Coordination is close with the regional DEA office in Pretoria and the Narcotics Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria.

# Syria

## I. Summary

In 2001, the Syrian government continued to make progress in combating the drug trade within its own borders, although it remained a significant transit country. Jordan and the Gulf States are still the primary destinations for drugs transiting Syria from Lebanon and Turkey. Unlike in recent years, Syria did not use its influence in Lebanon to assist Lebanon in suppressing cannabis cultivation and harvesting in the Biqa' Valley. This fact, combined with a lack of Lebanese eradication and crop substitution efforts, led to a sharp increase in hashish production in Lebanon. Despite the increase in hashish production in Lebanon's Biqa' Valley, there is no indication that this cannabis finds its way to the U.S. in sufficient quantities to have a significant effect. , Syria's counternarcotics cooperation with neighboring Turkey and Jordan remained ongoing and robust. Syria's domestic drug abuse problem remained small, due largely to the active enforcement of existing laws and the cultural and religious norms that stigmatize substance abuse. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Most narcotics transiting Syria go to other parts of the Near East region and to Europe. Syria is a transit country for hashish and heroin, particularly from Turkey, but also from Lebanon. Syria is also a transit country for opium entering Lebanon from Afghanistan via Jordan. Opium transshipments through Syria decreased in 2001, as did shipments of cocaine from Brazil via Syria to Lebanon. On the other hand, there was an increase in shipments of drugs through Syria to Saudi Arabia and Israel via Jordan.

In the past, it has been alleged that Syrian military, particularly intelligence officers, have protected Lebanese narcotics (i.e., opiates) traffickers in return for corrupt payments. No members of the Syrian military stationed in Lebanon were prosecuted for drug trafficking in 2001.

Syrian counternarcotics officials maintain that Syria has no information about changes in the rate of drug production in the Syrian-controlled Biqa' Valley. These officials maintain that drug production in the Syrian-controlled Biqa' Valley has decreased significantly, even in remote mountainous areas without roads. They acknowledge that some low-ranking individuals in the Syrian military have been arrested in the past with small amounts of drugs, but maintain that there have been no cases of Syrian military involvement in narcotics trafficking in the past several years.

Syria was added to the list of major illicit drug producing or major drug-transit countries in the late 1980's because opium production in the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Biqa' Valley exceeded the threshold limits in the definition of "major illicit drug producing country" set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. By 1991, it was estimated that 3,400 hectares of opium were being cultivated in the Biqa' Valley. In 1992, Syria and Lebanon launched a successful eradication campaign reducing poppy cultivation initially to approximately 150 hectares, and eventually eliminating it almost entirely. The cultivation of cannabis, processed into hashish primarily for non-U.S. markets, was also reduced drastically during this period. Once it was clear that opium cultivation with a significant impact on the U.S. had been almost entirely eliminated, Syria was removed from the Majors List in 1997.

While poppy cultivation in the Biqa' Valley remained negligible, cannabis cultivation increased significantly in 2001, from 200 hectares to approximately 4,010 hectares in early 2002, according to a reliable Lebanese expert. This increase was due to the lack of crop eradication efforts and effective crop substitution programs. This development raises the concern of a return to opium cultivation in the Biqa' Valley, should a market emerge for the product; Afghanistan has been more than meeting demand for opiates during the last several years.

### III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Syria's anti-trafficking law of 1993 calls for the death penalty for certain narcotics-related offenses. In practice however most death sentences are commuted and the maximum sentence actually handed down is 30 years. There were no death sentences in narcotics-related cases in 2001. Many cases are pending under the anti-trafficking law, and there are ongoing prosecutions of drug offenders. There is also provision in Syrian law for the seizure of assets financed by profits from the drug trade. The government has used this legislation to seize assets on a case-by-case basis.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Syrian authorities have historically seized only very small amounts of precursor chemicals in transit. In 1999 the Syrian government implemented a 1996 plan to control these chemicals. Diversion of precursor chemicals through Syria is believed to occur on a small scale, although Syrian authorities reported an increase in the diversion of such precursors from Lebanon to Turkey via Jordan in 2001.

Until recently, Syria had cooperated closely with Lebanese authorities in enforcement efforts against cultivation and production of illicit drugs. However, in 2001, Syrian authorities did not continue this cooperation, at least with respect to the suppression of cannabis cultivation in Lebanon's Biqa' Valley. Syria continued to cooperate closely with Jordan on narcotics matters. Syrian counternarcotics officials maintain that cooperation with Turkey on narcotics control has steadily improved, and characterize the current working relationship as "excellent." Within Syria, Syrian authorities confiscated 5.2 kilograms of cocaine, 1.9 kilograms of opium, 360 kilograms of hashish, and 1.25 million captagon (ATS) pills. Syrian authorities reported the arrest of 1,504 individuals on narcotics-related charges in 1,135 narcotics-related cases in 2001.

**Corruption.** In the past there have been unconfirmed reports of corruption among some Syrian military officials in Lebanon involving the issuance of passes permitting the free movement of goods and persons in return for bribes. The Syrian government has an Investigations Administration (Internal Affairs Division) responsible for weeding out corrupt officers in the counternarcotics unit and the national police force. The Investigations Administration is independent of both the counternarcotics unit and the national police and reports directly to the Minister of the Interior. According to Syrian authorities, there were no arrests or prosecutions of officers in the counter narcotics unit for corruption in 2001. The Syrian government does not as a matter of government policy encourage or condone the production or trafficking in narcotics.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Syria is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In December 2000, Syria signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. Syria is a member of INTERPOL. Syria maintains counternarcotics agreements with Cyprus, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Italy. The agreement with Turkey, part of a broader security arrangement, was signed in September, 2001 and concerns joint actions to combat smuggling of narcotics and precursor chemicals. The agreement with Italy was signed in January 2002<sup>2</sup> and focuses on information-sharing.

**Cultivation/Production.** The SARG has an effective counternarcotics system in place that has reduced cultivation and production of narcotics in Syria to negligible levels. As noted elsewhere in this report, cooperation with Lebanon to suppress illicit cultivation in the Syrian-occupied sections of the Biqa' Valley failed to prevent a resurgence in the illicit cultivation of cannabis.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Drug interdiction remains the focus of the Syrian counternarcotics effort. Syrian officials estimate in 2001 that the overall flow of narcotics transiting Syria and destined for other countries in the region was approximately the same as in 2000. Transshipment of narcotics from Turkey continues to represent the major challenge to Syria's counternarcotics efforts. Seizure statistics suggest a significant

decrease in shipments of cocaine, heroin, and hashish. Cocaine transshipments via Jordan to the Gulf States have surpassed in volume cocaine shipments to Lebanon, which decreased in 2001.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** As a result of the social stigma attached to drug use and stiff penalties under Syria's strict anti-trafficking law, the incidence of drug abuse in Syria remains low. The Syrian government's counternarcotics strategy, which is coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior, uses the media to educate the public on the dangers of drug use, and drug awareness is also part of the national curriculum for schoolchildren. Treatment is available through Syria's healthcare system.

#### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**Policy Initiatives.** In meetings with Syrian officials, the U.S. continues to stress the need for diligence in preventing narcotics and precursor chemicals from transiting Syrian territory. The U.S. also emphasizes the need to work with the Lebanese government in dismantling drug laboratories in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, and the necessity of terminating any involvement, active or passive, of individual Syrian officials in the drug trade.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** U.S. Embassy officials in Damascus and DEA officials based in Nicosia maintain an ongoing dialogue with Syrian authorities on drug issues. Additionally, high-ranking U.S. officials periodically share their views and recommendations with the Syrian ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior. There are no U.S.-funded counternarcotics assistance projects in Syria.

**The Road Ahead.** The U.S. will continue to encourage the Syrian government to maintain its commitment to combating drug transit and production in the region; to follow through on plans to enact anti-money laundering legislation; and to continue to encourage Syria to improve its counternarcotics cooperation with neighboring countries. In light of the resurgence of illicit cannabis cultivation in the Bika' Valley, the U.S. will warn of the danger of the re-emergence of illicit poppy cultivation as well. The U.S. will also encourage Syrian officials to continue their work with their Lebanese counterparts to ensure that drug production in Lebanon remains at low levels; to find and destroy drug processing laboratories in those areas where Syrian forces are present; and to work to minimize the involvement of Syrian officials in drug trafficking.

# Tanzania

## I. Summary

Tanzania is located along trafficking routes from Asia and the Middle East to South Africa, Europe, and the United States. Drugs like hashish, Mandrax, cocaine, heroin, and opium have found their way into and through Tanzania's porous borders. In addition, the domestic production of cannabis continues to grow. As a result, drug abuse, particularly involving cannabis, but also cocaine and heroin, continues to increase, especially among younger more affluent people. Violent crime associated with drug smuggling also increased during the year. To combat narcotics trafficking, Tanzania, along with Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda, launched a regional counternarcotics trafficking initiative in June. Rampant corruption diminishes the capacity of institutions to combat trafficking. Tanzania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and, in conjunction with UNDCP, is seeking to address objectives of that Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Until 1989, Tanzania's contact with drugs was largely limited to the traditional cultivation of cannabis in some parts of the mainland. Since then, the situation has changed dramatically and new drugs for Tanzania like Mandrax, cocaine, heroin, and opium have found their way into and through Tanzania's porous borders. In addition, the domestic production of cannabis is growing. As a result, drug abuse (particularly with more affordable substances like cannabis and Mandrax) is still increasing, especially among younger people. Harder drugs (heroin and cocaine) are used in small quantities within the affluent classes. Crack cocaine use appears to be growing more prevalent. The growing tourism industry, particularly in Zanzibar, continues to create a larger demand for narcotics there.

Tanzania is located along trafficking routes with numerous possible illegal points of entry. Illicit drugs entering Tanzania originate from Pakistan, India, Thailand, Burma, Iran, Syria, and South America, and are en route to Europe, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, the United States. The amount of drugs transiting Tanzania does not, however, significantly affect the United States. Drugs enter Tanzania by air, sea, roads, and rail. Major points of entry include airports in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, and Kilimanjaro, and sea ports at Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, as well as smaller ports like Tanga and Mtwara. There were reports during the year that illegal activity through the port of Tanga had increased after the Government attempted to control graft and customs abuses in the major sea ports. Zanzibar, known to be a drug transit point through its sea and airports, apparently experienced less illegal activity in 2001 after the new Zanzibar administration began cracking down on corruption at the port and enforcing customs regulations. It is widely believed, however, that traffickers conduct a significant amount of narcotics smuggling off-shore in small "dhow" boats that do not stop in ports.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** In 1995 Tanzania passed the Prevention of Illicit Traffic and Drugs Acts, which establishes severe punishments for the production and trafficking of narcotics. It stipulates long sentences, including life imprisonment, and permits seizure of assets used in illicit trafficking. Offenses under this act are not bailable. A 1995 act of parliament also created the Inter-Ministerial Anti-Drug Commission (IADC) (established in 1997) to define, coordinate, and promote Tanzania's national and sub-regional narcotics policies. In 1999 the UNDCP helped finance a workshop for the IADC to develop the framework for a national master plan to combat drug trafficking and abuse. A UNDCP-funded expert has been working with the commission and a plan has been submitted to the cabinet for approval. The plan originally was expected to be completed and published by mid-2001, but due to bureaucratic delays, it had not been finalized by year's end.

The Southern African Development Community, of which Tanzania is a member, has approved an counternarcotics action plan with the following objectives:

- Acquire information about drug use and trafficking in the region;
- Inform policy makers about the drug situation; and
- Develop a legal framework to counteract drug use and trafficking.

**Accomplishments.** While the counternarcotics efforts of Zimbabwe's law enforcement authorities showed improvement in some areas during the year (see Law Enforcement Efforts below), the government failed to institute the counternarcotics master plan.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Tanzania has three counternarcotics police units of more than 50 officers in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, and Moshi. A structured cooperation between counternarcotics police in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania is well established, with bi-annual meetings to discuss regional narcotics issues. This cooperation has resulted in an increase in communication, as well as effectiveness in their individual narcotics control efforts. In June 2001 the group launched a regional counternarcotics trafficking initiative. Through the UNDCP, Tanzania received \$700,000 in 2001 as counternarcotics assistance. These funds are used for capacity building for law enforcement, institution building, and demand reduction. Tanzania also participates in UNDCP regional projects.

In the most recent year for which accurate statistics are available, the GOT seized 7.1 kilograms of heroin in 1999, compared to 4.6 kilograms in 1997. In May 2001, in a joint operation with police from Malawi, South Africa, Botswana, Kenya, and Uganda, law enforcement officers seized ten grams of heroin, three grams of cocaine, and 6,079 kilograms of cannabis in four different regions of the country. Between June and August, Tanzanian police investigators conducted raids in ten different regions, seizing 150 tons of cannabis and 150 grams of heroin and arresting 1,132 individuals. In April, three Tanzanians, arriving from Lahore, Pakistan were arrested for possession of heroin at Dar es Salaam International Airport. A South African national was arrested in December for possession of cocaine as he transited Tanzania on the way from South America to Zimbabwe and South Africa.

**Corruption.** Pervasive corruption is a serious problem in the Tanzanian Police Force. The government took some steps during the year to discourage and punish such abuses. Most significantly, in June, the Inspector General of Police conducted a major reorganization in the police force. The reorganization was the largest in 20 years, and the stated intent of the action was to curb corruption. The Inspector General reshuffled police commanders on a smaller scale twice more during the year in November and December. Despite the personnel changes, as well as the activities of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), there were numerous complaints from civil society about police corruption. In addition, it is evident that corrupt officials at airports facilitate the transshipment of narcotics through Tanzania. As a matter of government policy, however, the country does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions; nor does any senior official of the government encourage such activities.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Tanzania is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention. Tanzania also has signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Drug Control. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty is applicable to Tanzania by an exchange of notes in 1965.

**Cultivation/Production.** Traditional cultivation of cannabis takes place in remote parts of the country, mainly for domestic use. No figures exist, but police and government officials report that production continues to increase. In February 2001, working from an informant's tip, Tanzanian police officers in Dar es Salaam raided a clandestine drug manufacturing laboratory that produced Mandrax. The seizure of equipment demonstrated that Tanzania is becoming a manufacturing location for certain types of illegal drugs, such as Mandrax.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Due to its location and porous borders, seaports, and airports, Tanzania has become a significant transit country for narcotics moving in sub-Saharan Africa. Control at the ports is

especially difficult as sophisticated methods of forged documents combine with poor controls and untrained and corrupt officials. Heroin trafficking in Tanzania is beginning to have an impact on the U.S. Afghan heroin entering Tanzania from Pakistan is being smuggled to the U.S. by Nigerian traffickers. In addition, a growing number of Tanzanians have been arrested abroad for serving as drug couriers. The Port of Dar es Salaam is a major entry point for Mandrax from India headed toward South Africa. Only small amounts of narcotics are seized due to lack of resources and corruption. Because of the limited training and operational capabilities of its counternarcotics officers, Tanzania's efforts are narrowly focused and extremely limited in effectiveness. Tanzanian police officers do not understand how to implement profiling techniques, and narcotics interdiction seizures generally result from heroin smugglers arriving from the Gulf or South Asia who become ill en route from ingested narcotics, or tips from police informants. Senior Tanzanian counternarcotics officials acknowledge that their officers are under-trained and under-resourced. In addition, low salaries for law enforcement officers provide a constant temptation for engaging in corrupt behavior and looking the other way when traffickers transit the country. Another example of lack of resources is that the Tanzanian Coast Guard, which is responsible for a large portion of Tanzania's border, including the Indian Ocean, Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Malawi, and others, has only one functional boat, which was donated by the UK in 1998.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** Tanzania traditionally was believed to be only a transit point for narcotics, but signs point to an increase in consumer use, particularly with lower cost drugs. There has been no study of narcotics consumption, but the UNDCP continues to work on the results of a rapid-assessment study of drug abuse in Tanzania. In addition, IADC is compiling narcotics statistics in a central data bank. It is known that domestic demand is increasing due to both spill-over from trafficking and increased tourism. The tourist industry has brought ecstasy to Zanzibar, and police reports confirm that crack cocaine is available locally as well.

#### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

U.S. programs for addressing the narcotics problem in Tanzania are focused on training for law enforcement officials. In October and November, 24 police officers and immigration officials attended a course sponsored by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms on Rural Border Patrol Operations. In September and October, six Tanzanian police officers attended the Law Enforcement Executive Development Course at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Gaborone, Botswana. A significant portion of the course involved counternarcotics investigative techniques and training. In September, two counternarcotics officers attended a DEA-sponsored course on Clandestine Drug Laboratories in Pretoria. In January 2002, an counternarcotics officer attended a three-week course on narcotics and contraband interdiction in Gaborone.

# Togo

## I. Summary

Togo is drawn into the vortex of Nigerian drug trafficking because of its proximity to Nigeria, and some of the same problems of poverty and corruption which encourage drug trafficking in Nigeria. In 2001, the Government of Togo (GOT) made numerous drug-related arrests, including many at Lome's international airport. Most of the arrests involved Nigerian nationals trafficking cocaine and heroin. Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Togo cultivates small amounts of cannabis primarily for local consumption. The GOT believes some small share of illicit cannabis is exported, but has no useful estimate. Togo's relatively porous borders permit narcotics traffickers relatively easy access into the country. This ease of access has made Togo a transit point for narcotics such as cocaine and heroin, although there is no evidence available to suggest that narcotics that transit Togo have a significant effect on the United States. Most of the narcotics traffickers who have been arrested in Togo have been Nigerian nationals travelling from Pakistan to West Africa.

## III. Country Action Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** Togo has developed a sound national strategy to approach the drug problem:

- Improve the management of drug control;
- Promote research into trafficking routes and the nature of domestic drug demand; and
- Improve coordination among enforcement forces.

Togo's additional goals include:

- Improve cooperation among enforcement forces by creating a commonly accessible enforcement databank;
- Eliminate overlapping jurisdictions;
- Combat illegal domestic production through enhanced law enforcement and eradication;
- Combat money laundering of drug funds; and
- Follow a no tolerance policy: Combat all levels of the illegal drug problem, from the individual who is abusing prescription medicines to the drug kingpin who transships kilograms of heroin or cocaine through Togo.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Togo authorities are doing what they can to staunch the flow of illegal drugs through Togo, but efforts are hampered by budget problems and inadequately trained personnel. Other obstacles include borders that are difficult to police, and determined violators who swallow balloons filled with illicit drugs and seek to enter Togo via the air carrier Ethiopian Airways, which has service from Pakistan to West Africa. Togo's enforcement officials are aware of the threat accompanying the increase in international trade, which often leads to an increase in narcotics flow, but their best efforts remain inadequate to the challenge. The GOT believes increased drug flow through Togo has caused an upsurge in violent crime in general.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** Togo has the following goals for reducing the demand for drugs:

- Use the media to discourage drug abuse;
- Increase rehabilitation efforts, including detoxification and counseling and support; and
- Reinforce rehabilitation by developing job-training programs and providing re-adjustment assistance to former addicts.

There is neither money nor infrastructure for rehabilitation programs for drug addicts; however, the National Narcotic Control Board continues to take proactive measures similar to the D.A.R.E. program in the United States. Through the creative use of soccer games among youth groups throughout the country, the committee has spread the word about the dangers of drug use and trafficking.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Togo has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.

#### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

The U.S. tries to help the GOT improve its ability to interdict illicit narcotics entering Togo and to prosecute those traffickers who are caught. Togo's emerging willingness to confront the issue of illicit drugs is tempered by the country's ongoing transition to multi-party democracy and the weak state of GOT finances. The USG has been unable to provide any assistance to Togo's counternarcotics efforts, beyond training, over the last several years, but keeps Togo's needs under regular review.

# Tunisia

## I. Summary

Tunisia's role as a drug transshipment point is limited, but the government has continued its cooperation with neighboring states and with international bodies to interdict drug shipments. In 1992 Tunisia passed drug-enforcement legislation to implement the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The government has an active counternarcotics education program, focusing on youth, and encourages counternarcotics educational activities by NGOs. Tunisia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of the Country

Tunisia is not a significant drug transshipment point, and it does not play a significant role in precursor chemical production. Tunisia is a transit point for individual smugglers taking hashish from Morocco to Europe. There are no published figures for consumption of narcotics. NGOs active in the field report that consumption is limited, but has increased in recent years, primarily at high schools, universities, and tourist resorts. There is a negligible amount of illicit cultivation of cannabis in northern Tunisia. Cannabis was cultivated legally for local use in pre-independence Tunisia.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Accomplishments.** The Government of Tunisia (GOT) continues to give a high priority to counternarcotics law enforcement, and during the year arrested and prosecuted drug traffickers and users. The Tunisian press reported on several significant cases during the year, including the trial of several French and Tunisian traffickers in the country's second-largest city of Sfax. Anecdotal evidence from some younger individuals indicates that hard drugs are difficult to find or buy in Tunisia.

**Corruption.** Tunisia does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. There is no evidence that any senior official of the government engages in, encourages, or facilitates the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. The 1992 drug law provides for sentences to be doubled if a drug-related crime is committed by a drug enforcement official or person involved in the administration or guarding of drug warehouses or depots.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Tunisia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In 1992 Tunisia enacted drug-enforcement legislation to implement the Convention. Tunisia is also a party to the Arab Convention against Illegal Trafficking in Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Tunisia has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Tunisia is not a major drug transshipment country. There are reportedly some individual hashish smugglers from Morocco who transit Tunisia en route to Europe.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** The GOT conducts drug education programs in schools and encourages NGOs to conduct complementary educational programs. There is not a significant addict population.

### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

The United States supports Tunisian efforts to comply fully with the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and it seeks Tunisian support for U.S. international counternarcotics initiatives. The United States has not provided counternarcotics assistance to the GOT in recent years. The United States in the past provided narcotics-related training assistance in maritime security for Tunisian customs officials.

# United Arab Emirates

## I. Summary

Although not a narcotics producing nation, the UAE is a transshipment point for traffickers moving illegal drugs westward from the major drug producing countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Two separate seizures of large quantities of illegal drugs in the emirates of Sharjah (1,102 kilograms of hashish) and Dubai (13.7 tons of hashish) during the past year underscore this conclusion. Besides the country's general laissez faire attitude toward trade, there are several other factors that make the UAE vulnerable to narcotics trafficking, including its proximity to major drug cultivation regions in South Asia, long (700 kilometers) coastline, and relative affluence. For a discussion of anti-money laundering measures the UAE took in 2001, see the Money Laundering section of this report.

Published statistics on narcotics seizures and domestic addiction reveal a growing drug problem among UAE and third-country nationals which, while not significant by U.S. standards, is notable given the country's harsh drug laws. The overwhelming majority of drug seizures have netted hashish, not heroin, opium, or cocaine. The Ministry of Interior's Federal Higher Anti-Drugs Committee is tasked with coordinating drug enforcement efforts for the seven emirates that form the UAE, as well as executing the country's counternarcotics strategy. The UAE is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and is committed to the fight against international narcotics trafficking and narcotics abuse.

## II. Status of Country

The UAE is a transshipment point for illegal narcotics from the drug cultivating regions of South and Southwest Asia en route primarily to Europe. Illicit narcotics transiting the UAE have reached the United States, although Western Europe is the principal market for these drugs.

The majority of arrests for illegal trafficking occur in the northern emirates. Factors that contribute to the prominence of the northern emirates are the emergence of Dubai and Sharjah as regional centers in the transportation of passengers and cargo, a porous land border with Oman, and the presence of active "free trade zones" in all the emirates except Abu Dhabi.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** In November 2001, the UAE government (UAEG) hosted the 36th session of the UNDCP Sub-commission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East. The assembled delegates discussed a number of issues facing the region, including the likely impact of the Afghan crisis on future heroin production, the need to counter money laundering, and emerging drug trafficking trends. That an Emirati Brigadier General, Dr. Mohamed Khalifa Al-Mualla, agreed to stand for the Sub-commission's Chairmanship and was chosen, demonstrates the importance the UAEG attaches to regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking and the UNDCP's work.

The UAE continues to advance its national drug strategy aimed at reducing both the supply and demand for illegal drugs. Among the major supply reduction initiatives announced in 2001 was a proposal to create an Anti-Narcotics Department on the federal level to replace the existing federal committee for fighting drugs. This reorganization, if approved, would mean additional personnel and a larger budget to wage the war on drugs.

The UAE has continued to pursue the following other initiatives:

- the improvement through training of the country's counternarcotics units and the formation of special units for maritime counternarcotics operations;

- the passage of laws requiring better monitoring of precursor chemicals;
- increased cooperation with neighboring countries on information exchange and drug seizures; and
- enhanced cooperation with the UNDCP, the Nayif Academy for Security Science in Saudi Arabia, and other countries with expertise in counternarcotics efforts.

UAE authorities continue to participate in international counternarcotics fora. The UAEG has been extremely receptive to State Department, DEA, U.S. Coast Guard, and other U.S.-sponsored training.

The DEA has a close and continuing relationship with UAE officials and provided drug interdiction training to the UAE in 2001. The exchange of information between the two sides has led to at least one arrest. Also in the past year, the FBI has partnered with the Dubai police in the Middle East Law Enforcement Training Center, which offers training to UAE and GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) law enforcement agencies. Courses in drug investigations and transnational crime, which will assist in combating illicit drugs, will be offered in 2002.

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** UAE authorities acknowledge that narcotics consumption is an increasing problem among the local population. Government statistics indicate that the number of registered addicts jumped from 253 in 1999 to 415 in 2000. In the emirate of Sharjah, a study of drug users seeking rehabilitation indicated that most addicts fell in the age group 18-29, that 44 percent had a good income, and that hashish, followed by heroin, was the drug of choice. Emirati officials also cite the increasing number of drug addicts that die from their habit (20 in 2000, including a homemaker) as a sign of the worsening drug problem.

Punishment for drug offenses in the UAE is severe; a 1995 law stipulated capital punishment as the penalty for drug trafficking. No executions, however, have ever been carried out. In 1999 the death sentence was imposed on a Canadian citizen for possession with intent to distribute narcotics, but a UAE court later commuted the sentence to life in prison. (Prisoners serving a life sentence in the UAE are typically paroled after 25 years.) The minimum sentence for individuals convicted of using drugs in the UAE is four years. The sentence is extended to seven years if a possession charge is added, as is often the case.

The most celebrated drug-related case in 2001 involved two British nationals who were given life terms for using, distributing, and in the case of one, importing illegal narcotics. In the same case, a British national was sentenced to ten years for possession, while a Lebanese national received a four-year jail term for drug use. In 1999, an Indian national was sentenced to ten years in jail for bringing unfrosted "khuskhus" (poppy seeds), which are said to contain opium, into the country.

Several large seizures during 2001 indicate that the UAE is a regional transshipment point for illegal drugs. Of greatest significance was the confiscation in November of nearly 14 tons of hashish destined for Canada, Australia, Yemen, Iran, and the Netherlands. An earlier seizure in Sharjah netted 1,102 kilograms of hashish. In both instances the hashish had originated in Afghanistan and transited Iran before arriving in the UAE for distribution elsewhere. The lack of large seizures of heroin in the UAE to date makes its role in this trade unclear.

The local press reports the street value of one kilogram of Pakistani hashish to be U.S. \$4,658 in Abu Dhabi and U.S. \$3,288 in Dubai. The price is said to be highest in Abu Dhabi and Dubai because the customer base in these two emirates tends to be more affluent.

In October 2001, the UAE Coast Guard was folded into the UAE Navy, under the Ministry of Defense. The degree to which the Navy is able to integrate the Coast Guard's mission into its own will determine the UAE's ability to effectively police the country's long borders against illegal narcotics smuggling.

**Corruption.** There is no evidence that corruption of public officials is a systemic problem, or that as a matter of government policy, the UAE encourages or facilitates the production or trafficking of illicit

narcotics or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. In April 2001, the former head of Dubai Customs and Port Authority, along with five other Customs officials, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 27 years in prison on charges of corruption and embezzlement. Four months later he was pardoned by the Dubai government and released. This incident involved an attempt at personal enrichment unrelated to narcotics smuggling.

**Agreements and Treaties.** The UAE is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

The UAE is a party to other multilateral or bilateral counternarcotics conventions, including agreements with Pakistan and India. The UAEG has also signed a number of memoranda of understanding on counternarcotics cooperation with other governments, including the United States and UK.

**Cultivation/Production.** There is no known illicit cultivation or illicit production in the UAE.

**Drug Flow/Transit.** Hashish, heroin, and opium shipments originate in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India and are smuggled in cargo containers, via small vessels and powerboats, and/or sent overland via Oman. The UAE, and Dubai in particular, is a major regional transportation and shipping hub. High overall shipping volume means that UAE territory is vulnerable to exploitation by narcotics traffickers. UAE authorities also recognize that the number of human carriers of illicit narcotics transiting local airports is on the rise.

Recognizing the need for increased monitoring at their commercial shipping ports, airports, and borders, the UAEG is making efforts to tighten inspections of cargo containers as well as passengers transiting the UAE. Container throughput for Dubai was 2.8 million units in 1998 and an estimated 14 million people passed through the emirate's airport in 2000. Customs officials are randomly searching containers and following up leads of suspicious cargo. Customs officials and inspector in Abu Dhabi received specialized training on how to ferret out drugs in 2001 from U.S. experts. The UAEG is in the process of procuring state-of-the-art equipment, which allows for rapid, thorough searches of shipping containers and vehicles.

**Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction).** The UAE is a relatively affluent country. The UAEG has established an extensive treatment and rehabilitation program for its citizens. There are rehabilitation centers in Abu Dhabi, Ajman, and Sharjah, and there are two in Dubai. In accordance with a federal law, UAE nationals who are addicted can present themselves to the police or a rehabilitation center and be exempted from criminal prosecution. They undergo a two-year drug rehabilitation program, which includes family counseling/therapy. Those nationals who do not turn themselves into local authorities are referred to the courts for prosecution. When convicted of narcotics offenses, third-country nationals or "guest workers," who make up approximately 80 percent of the UAE's population, generally receive prison sentences and are deported upon completing their sentences.

A national drug demand reduction plan to increase public awareness of the dangers of drugs and to help drug victims will be fully operative by 2003. Ongoing efforts include public statements by senior UAE officials, including the former Chairman of the National Anti-Narcotics Committee who urged the UAEG to fight drug traffickers with the same intensity with which the United States is fighting terrorism. The government also encouraged directors of the country's telecommunications monopoly to print counternarcotics messages on bills mailed to all customers. The UAEG's demand reduction plan also focuses on programs to ensure that the unemployed and those released from prison are provided jobs. UAE citizens also receive incentives through the Marriage Fund to lead stable family-oriented lives, and are provided financial incentives to cooperate with police in detecting drug crimes. (The Interior Minister has an annual allocation of U.S. \$65,575 set aside for this purpose.) Public awareness campaigns are directed at young people. UAE officials believe that adherence to Muslim religious mores as well as the imposition of severe prison sentences for individuals convicted of drug offenses are an effective deterrent to narcotics abuse.

### IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

**U.S. Policy Initiatives.** U.S. policy seeks continued and enhanced participation by the UAEG in programs dealing with narcotics trafficking, precursor chemicals diversion, border/export control, and money laundering. In 2001, the United States organized training initiatives related to money laundering, border/export control, and narcotics interdiction. Other initiatives include the FBI/Dubai police partnership in the Middle East Law Enforcement Training Center, which provides training to UAE as well as GCC law enforcement agencies. The Center's training schedule for 2002 includes segments on drug investigations and transnational crimes, both of which will aid the UAE in combating illegal drugs. Additional U.S.-sponsored training and exchange programs on export control, money laundering, and drug interdiction have been scheduled tentatively for 2002. Most USG costs for offering training in the UAE and other relatively wealthy oil exporting countries of the Persian Gulf are paid for on a reimbursable basis by the countries benefiting from the training.

**Bilateral Cooperation.** The UAEG cooperates with U.S. law enforcement on appropriate narcotics cases involving the two countries. UAE officials work closely with DEA personnel. An exchange of information in 2001 led to an arrest by Dubai police of an individual attempting to sell 400 grams of heroin.

**The Road Ahead.** The United States will continue to support the UAE government's efforts to devise and employ bilateral/multilateral strategies against illicit narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The United States will encourage the UAEG to focus enforcement efforts on dismantling major trafficking organizations and prosecuting their leaders, and to enact asset forfeiture and seizure legislation.

# Zambia

## I. Summary

Zambia is not a major drug producer or exporter, and it is not considered a major drug-transit country. The Zambia Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) is responsible for counternarcotics enforcement in Zambia. The DEC works well with the Zambia Police Service (ZPS), as well as with U.S. and other foreign law enforcement authorities. DEC statistics report an approximately 56 percent success rate in prosecutions of suspected drug offenders in 2001. Zambian law enforcement officials are committed to drug enforcement efforts, but the program, like much of Zambia's law enforcement efforts, suffers from a lack of resources. Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

## II. Status of Country

Zambia is not considered a major source of manufactured illicit drugs, it is not a principal drug transit area, and it is not a supplier of precursor chemicals. The illegal cultivation of cannabis by subsistence farmers, seeking to supplement their meager earnings, is by far the most significant drug abuse-related problem. Cannabis seizures made up 90 percent of total illegal drug seizures in 2001. Cannabis is intercropped in large tracts of land with cash crops such as maize, cotton, and cassava to avoid detection. DEC officials believe that subsistence farmers, ignorant of the penalties and drawn by the monetary incentives, are often lured into drug cultivation by "syndicates" operating in Zambia and the southern African region.

By the DEC's account, most of the cannabis grown in southern and western regions of Zambia finds ready markets in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. A recent trend has been the importation from Malawi of a potent strain of cannabis known on the street as "Malawi Gold." Zambian traffickers (most often truck drivers), in concert with Malawian traffickers, smuggle the product into Zambia's larger cities, such as Lusaka, Kitwe, and Ndola, from where it is later smuggled into South Africa or Botswana. In a typical incident, four Zambians were arrested in a Lusaka hotel attempting to sell 16.5 kilograms of "Malawi Gold."

Cannabis is believed to be the most abused illegal drug in Zambia. The majority of offenders treated in drug rehabilitation centers are treated for cannabis dependence. Consumption of cannabis in Zambia is mostly confined to the urban young, although the rural villagers use cannabis to a lesser extent. While there are no reliable statistics concerning the use of other drugs, anecdotal evidence indicates increasing consumption of some imported drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, hashish, and amphetamines, mostly by foreigners resident in Zambia and by some wealthier Zambians.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

**Policy Initiatives.** A three-year drug control master plan launched in October 1998 finished up in October 2001. The objectives of the plan, including research on the extent of the drug problem in Zambia and reduction in domestic demand for drugs through public awareness of the dangers of drug abuse, were broadly achieved. The major policy initiative in 2001 was passage of the "Prohibition and Prevention Of Money Laundering Act No. 14."

**Law Enforcement Efforts.** Through the first ten months of 2001, Zambian drug enforcement officials seized in excess of 13 metric tons of cannabis. Zambian drug officers also seized minor quantities of several different amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). The seizure of Mandrax (methaqualone) decreased in 2001, with only 15 grams of powder and one tablet seized, a significant reduction from 2000. While trafficking of Mandrax was characterized as "moderate in scope" in the 2000 INCSR, it appears that Zambia's interdiction efforts have successfully reduced the amount of Mandrax transiting the country.

Zambians formed the majority of individuals arrested for drug offenses, with 2,543 Zambians taken into custody. There were also significant numbers of foreign nationals, including 26 Tanzanians, 27 D.R. Congolese, 21 Angolans, 19 Somalis, and 12 South Africans.

**Corruption.** Zambia's anticorruption commission investigates cases of corruption within all government institutions, including the DEC. There are no indications that senior government officials are involved in drug-related offenses.

**Agreements and Treaties.** Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. A 1931 U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty is applicable to Zambia. Zambia is one of the Southern African countries that will benefit from the UN-implemented, U.S.-supported land border crossing project.

#### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

The U.S. actively assists the DEC to procure drug enforcement-related equipment and to obtain training. In September 2001, two laboratory technicians from the DEC attended training in clandestine drug laboratory investigations, sponsored by the U.S. DEA. In 2001, a team of experts from U.S. Customs and the INS inspected border crossings as part of an effort to improve border control operations. Subject to the availability of funds, DEC agents will attend several courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Botswana in 2002.

# Zimbabwe

## I. Summary

Zimbabwe is not a major producer, supplier, or exporter of drugs or precursor chemicals. Cannabis remains the biggest drug problem in Zimbabwe, with the majority (80 percent) being imported from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. The remainder is grown in Zimbabwe. More than 50 percent of the drug is re-exported to Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia. Ecstasy has emerged as the second most popular drug in Zimbabwe within the last year. Although Zimbabwe is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and ratified the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol, an existing unified government program of prevention and enforcement remains largely unfunded and inactive. Zimbabwe has neither requested, nor has it received U.S.-funded assistance in the past two years.

## II. Status of Country

Production, cultivation, and trafficking in illicit drugs in Zimbabwe is limited, as is the production of precursor chemicals. Although cannabis is cultivated in the rural areas on a small scale for local use, it remains the biggest drug problem in Zimbabwe, with the majority (80 percent) being imported from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. More than 50 percent of the drug is re-exported to Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia. Hashish, cocaine, heroin, and LSD have also been noted in very limited quantities in larger urban areas such as Harare, Bulawayo, and Gweru. Unaffordable to the mainstream population, these drugs are generally used by affluent suburban youths. Ecstasy use has reportedly been on the rise, making it the second-most popular drug in Zimbabwe. The drug is predominately a product of the rave/nightclub party scene and is imported from the Netherlands, Britain, and South Africa. Due to its location along established routes, Zimbabwe has also been identified as a transshipment point for Mandrax, a drug produced in India and Pakistan for distribution in South Africa. Law enforcement authorities are not presently engaged in specific programs to combat drug use, production, or transshipment and view the counternarcotics effort as minor in comparison with other law enforcement challenges that they routinely face.

## III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2001

Zimbabwe is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, as well as the SADC Protocol. Zimbabwe is also a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. Zimbabwe has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. While the five-year Zimbabwe Drug Control Master Plan was formulated in 2000, it has yet to be approved by the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ). Drug seizures have declined in the past two years. Seizures are viewed as byproducts of law enforcement activities rather than objectives in an overall counternarcotics strategy. Nevertheless, offenders continue to be prosecuted in the courts, as they run afoul of law enforcement officers. Narcotics money laundering does not appear to be a problem, and there are no known indicators to demonstrate or suggest that government officials are engaged in or encourage illicit drug production or distribution. Zimbabwe recently hosted the first meeting of Southern African Heads of Drug Law Enforcement Services, consisting of representatives from Botswana, Mauritius, Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Interpol, and the U.S. Embassy in Harare. Six recommendations were the result of an open forum where countries shared their country summaries, strategies, and vulnerabilities. Two underlying themes of these recommendations include a desire for increased cooperation among agencies within single governments and among agencies in different countries and an emphasis on money laundering and asset forfeiture as a tool to supplement other enforcement tools.

### **IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs**

The U.S. government neither conducted nor proposed any counternarcotics policy initiatives in Zimbabwe during the past two years. Zimbabwe's overall problems with illicit drugs are relatively small, certainly in comparison with many neighboring countries, but unfortunately it appears the GOZ's attention to its counternarcotics efforts continues to be sidelined by a more pressing, yet controversial, political agenda.

